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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
Constitutional Follies
Americans revere their Constitution, but they often
do not seem to take it very seriously. That conclusion
arises from reflection on the recent wave of proposals
for constitutional amendment. It is fortunate that the
Founders made it as difficult as they did to change the
basic law of the land. Had they not, the recurring bouts
of enthusiasm for tinkering with the Constitution would
have soon burdened it with so much detail and so many
trivialities as to render it unworkable or at least bring
it into disrepute. One would think that the experience
with Prohibition would have taught Americans the danger of institutionalizing transient moods, but the current
outbreak of amendment fever suggests that no such
lesson has been learned.
The nation is now faced with no fewer than three
proposed constitutional amendments-dealing with a
balanced budget for the federal government, prayer in
the public schools, and abortion-whose chances for
passage within the foreseeable future range from fair
to reasonably good. Although, as will be seen, we reluctantly support one of them, we would argue that
under normal circumstances none of these issues should
be dealt with in a basic instrument of government. Yet
all soon may be, and Americans would do well to pay
close attention, if they have not done so already, both
to the issues themselves and to the larger constitutional
questions entangled with them.
Two important points must be made at the outset.
In the first place, to say that an issue should not be embedded in the Constitution is not to say that it is therefore unimportant. The Constitution should only address
itself to fundamental structures and processes of government and to essential rights and freedoms that we wish
to defend against the potential tyranny of the majority.
Other issues, however important, ought to be left to
the ordinary workings of the political process. Secondly,
it must be conceded that the Supreme Court itself bears
considerable responsibility for the recent upsurge in
efforts to fiddle with the Constitution. Had the Court
not intruded into areas it should have stayed out ofas with the abortion issue-many amendment efforts
would never have arisen. When the Supreme Court
abandons judicial restraint, it invites con titutional
frivolity.
October, 1982
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The Court cannot be blamed, however, for the politically most potent of the proposed amendments-the
effort to require a federa~ balanced budget. That is a
product of the public's impatience with persistent inflation and of the politicians' refusal in recent years
to act responsibly on fiscal policy. One can readily
understand the urge behind the amendment. Virtually
all economists agree that the appalling string of federal deficits in recent decades has contributed significantly to the high rate of inflation in general and to
ruinous interest rates in particular. Prudent public
policy would dictate that the budget be brought under
control. But that is not to say that the Constitution ought
to require an annual balanced budget. (The proposed
amendment would allow a deficit only in case of war or
if explicitly provided for by a three-fifths vote of Congress.)
It is often suggested that our recent experience of
high rates of inflation combined with low economic
growth demonstrates the inadequacy of Keynesian economics, which has been, at least until very rec ntly,
the regnant philosophy of the economic establishment.
Put in simplified terms, Keynesian theory called for
government management of aggregate demand, and
prescribed that fiscal policy should run counter to trend
in the business cycle, with the government stimulating
demand in times of rece ion by running d ficit and
acting to restrict demand in time of inflation by balancing the budget or running a urplus. Critic
of Keynesianism argue that the emerg nee in th 1970
of stagflation (low growth high inflation) und r pre idential admini tration Republican and D mo rati
alike, committed to Keyne ian poli i s rev al that th
theory simply doe not work. Mu h of the imp tu
behind the balanced-budget am ndm nt om
from
fiscal con ervative who have alwa
r gard d int ntionally-incurred gov rnment d fi it a
here y, what ver the circum tan
h y d
return to fi cal orth <lox and obri
Thi is not th occa ion for a thorou h anal
f
Keyne ian economi th ry.
ar p r uad d, on th
one hand that th criti i m of mon tari t and uppl 3

we should not use the Constitution as a crutch to help us do what only our political cowardice
prevents us from doing without it. Such use of the Constitution trivializes and demeans it.

ide economi t ha, id ntifi d c rtain inad qua i
in Keyn ian pre cription , but " al o u p t that
much of th percei d failure of Ke n iani m
me
from the irre pon ible wa it ha be n pra tic d. P liticians have been happy to invoke Ke ne on th down
ide of the economic c cl - pend fre 1 ta li htl but they have been unwilling to exerci e th di ciplin
of reduced pending and higher taxe that th policy
calls for in times of high demand. The blame for thi
cannot be laid entirely at the feet of elected officials.
The public in general ha made it politicall uicidal
for politicians to act in a re ponsible fa hion. E en
today, when virtually everyone concede the need for
reduced spending, economic group of e ery kind inist that all program be sacrificed but their own.
All this might seem an argument in favor of, rather
than against, the amendment. If, after all, it i only
the perversitie of political life that prevent u from
achieving the balanced budget most of us want, why not
give constitutional encouragement to our better fi cal
selves? What can be wrong with using our basic instrument of government to help us secure what most people
would presently perceive as a public benefit?
The answers to these questions involve economic
theory, constitutional principle, and the role of the
Supreme Court in the political process. To begin with,
we ought to avoid elevating fallible economic concepts
into constitutional absolutes. Most knowledgeable people agree that under present circumstances our budget
deficits have a negative effect on the economy. But if
the current sluggish rate of growth persists or worsens,
while interest and inflation rates continue to fall, then
we might look at things quite differently. The views of
certain conservative fundamentalists to the contrary
notwithstanding, budget deficits are not always an evil.
In a period of recession (especially one accompanied
by low interest rate ), government deficits could be a
useful, even necessary, tool to stimulate economic
growth. The budget needs to be balanced over the period of the economic cycle, but not necessarily in any
given fiscal year. It makes no sense to put a constitutional prohibition-even one that can be overridden
by a 60 per cent vote-in the way of what sound policy
might very well require.
And in those circum tances in which a balanced budget i desirable, there is nothing to prevent us from
having one save, perhaps, the necessary political will.
Surely if there exist the kind of national consensus required to enact a constitutional amendment then that
hould easily enough be translatable into direct political pressure on the normal budget proce . We should
not use the Con titution as a crutch to help us do what
only our political cowardice stops us from doing without
it. Such use of the Constitution trivialize and demean it.
4
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uch
circum tan
ourt upr me
Court-\ ould b a k d t rul on wh th r or not the
politician had act d in good faith. How v r it ruled,
the Court would find it elf d ply and inappropriat ly
invol ed in the detail of th budget pro
ho e
conservative who are pu hing the balan ed-budget
amendm nt and who ar al o champion of judicial
re traint ought to ponder the impos ible situation in
which the amendment would place the Court and the
danger it would po e to the principle of eparation
of powers.
And having so pondered, they ought to re trict their
struggle for fiscal responsibility to the legislative process and leave the Constitution to those extraordinary
situation where its ab olute mandates are truly required.

III
While the balanced-budget amendment could cause
real mischief, the effort to allow prayer in the public
schools is comparatively trivial. The issue arouses considerable emotion, but its significance, one way or the
other, is essentially symbolic. If prayer itself involves
the highest questions (questions that do not normally
intrude into the political arena) prayer in the public
schools will affect neither the destiny of souls nor the
fate of the Republic.
This is one of those cases where the Supreme Court's
own zealousness has created a constitutional issue.
Through most of American history, children all over
the country took part in religious exercises in public
schools as part of the accepted order of things. In 1962,
however, the Supreme Court ruled (Engel v. Vitale) that
a twenty-two word "non-sectarian" prayer recommended
by the New York State Board of Regents and adopted
by various local school boards in the state violated the
First Amendment prohibition against any "e tablishment of religion." A year later the Court truck down
on imilar ground a Penn lvania law requiring in
all tate chools the daily reading without comment,
of at least ten verses from the Bible. In both deci ion
The Cresset

Putting pray~r back in ~he P"_bl!c schools will do no great harm, but neither will it do anything
to advance either genume rel1g1on or the public interest. It is not an issue worth fighting over.

the ourt pp ar d t b gui l cl by th pirit of Thomas
Jeff r n'
I brat d argum nt that the E tablishment
Clau had b n int nd cl to r t 'a wall of eparation"
betw n hur h a, d tat . Whate er the basis of its
deci ion ·, th
urt in it ruling
t off an immense
publi furor that i till aliv and that focu e on a propo d amendm nt whi h would allow organized group
prayer in publi ch ol but which would al o stipulate
that "no p r on hall b r quir d ... to participate in
prayer."
A alway in th
matt r the con titutional question
must b kept eparat from the question of policy. It
may w 11 b inadvi abl practice for school boards to
mandate religious exerci e , but we are not at all convinced that it i uncon titutional- o long, that is, as
tho e tudent who for any reason choose to absent
themselves from religious activities remain free to do
so. Modern scholar hip indicates that Jefferson's "wall
of separation" view wa more idiosyncratic than repres ntative among the nation founder , most of whom
had no quarrel with gov rnment encouragement of
religion and who meant by "establishment of religion"
just that: the creation by government of an organic,
preferential relationship with a particular Christian
denomination, as on the model of the Church of England. The doctrine of distanced neutrality towards
religion in general that the Warren Court developed in
the 1960 would have struck most of the Founders as
bizarre and immoral. Only in the secular, pluralistic
America of the twentieth century would the practice
of school prayer come to be seen as incompatible with
the First Amendment's requirements.
Some argue that school prayer is unconstitutional
because it imposes alien beliefs on the irreligious or
on those whose religious views differ from those of the
majority in their community. That argument ignores
the proviso in the proposed amendment explicitly forbidding anyone being required to participate in prayer.
It may well be, as opponents argue, that asking for
exemption from religious exercises would expose
children to ridicule and persecution from their classmates, but we know of no constitutional right not to suffer
offense or embarrassment for one's beliefs. Freedom of
religion means freedom of practice (or non-practice),
not freedom from the scorn of those who believe otherwise.
Having said all that, we would till argue that upport
of the amendment is not worth the effort of serious
people particularly those for whom religiou faith
holds significant con equences. In a society as plurali tic a our , the only kind of religiou expre ion
likely to find approval in the chool would be o bland ,
o in ub tantial , o rooted in th lea t common d nominator a to amount to a kind of bla ph m to the
October. 1 82

genuinely pious. And if, by some chance, the designated
religious exercise would be such as to satisfy seriou.s
religious urgings, it would almost by definition be
grossly objectionable to those of other faiths. Caught
between what one scholar has called "political unitarianism" on the one hand and particularistic-and therefore sectarian - piety on the other, the corporate public
expression of religious faith in a pluralist democracy
can have no happy outcome. Better, in uch circumstances, to leave religion to voluntaristic practice.
We simply cannot follow the logic of those who see
the prayer amendment a a matter of seriou moment.
A minute or two of perfunctory prayer at the opening
of school will do nothing to repair the moral or piety
of the nation. The kind of prayer typically offered in
school exercises may offend the ecular humanists, but
it repre ents not so much true worship as a kind of
pious superstition. Most of the prayer we have endur d
in schools or other public places could as well have
been addressed to the spirit of manitou as to the Trinitarian God. There is no getting around the r ality of
our religious pluralism and in uch a ituation public
prayer has meaning to people in inver e ratio to th
particularity of their faith. The notion that God will
withhold or bestow his ble ing on our nation according
to uch meaningle exerci e a chool pray r r fl ct
an arrested (or unboundedly cumenical) tat of th ological reflection.
In ummary, then , the propounder of th
hool
prayer am ndment hav a r a onabl
on titutional
point, but they have mad it in th au of an i u
that is not worth fighting ov r. Puttin pray r ba k in
the public school will do no gr at harm but n ith r
will it do anything to advan
ith r g nuin r ligi n
or the public intere t.
I
Which brings u to th third and mo t v x cl f th
sugge ted amendm nt - enat r
rrin Hat h' pr posal that Congre and the tat b
regulate abortion and that in a
f
federal and tat law th
ne

in th

to att mpting
anti-ab rti n
i lativ pr
Th pr bl m \ ith

rti n

u , a' v

ha

s

Opponents of abortion have long traditions of law and moral conviction on their ids, and they
are not about to give up their struggle because of one highly-question ble Supreme Court decision.

noted befor in the pa
( Th
b rti n Dil mma,"
October 19 1) i that it pro id
for compromi . Pro- hoi e adv
woman within who b d th fetu
have ab olute right to fre dom of hoice in th
while pro-lif force in i t that in aborti n in
the taking of human life it can no mor b con id r d
solely a private matter than can an other form of homicide. On a literall life-and~d ath matter uch a thi
no middle way can ea ily be imagined. ( e ha
b n
intrigued however, b the argum nt that if w , r to
adopt the same criteria for a certaining the b ginning
of life that we apply to determining it nd-through
detection of heartbeat brain wa e , or reaction to
stimuli- abortion might be permitted until one of
those signs appear [roughly during the seventh or
eighth week of pregnancy] and then forbidden thereafter.)
The abortion issue differs significantly from both
the balanced budget and prayer amendment . nlike
school prayer, abortion is not a trivial matter. nlike
the budget question, it must, thank to the Supreme
Court, be fought at the constitutional level.
Indeed, pro-life forces are in the ironic position of
having to fight a constitutional struggle in order to
reduce abortion from a constitutional to a legislative
proposition. Their amendment would give no constitutional endorsement to their position; it would simply
allow them to attempt to prohibit abortion in Congress
and in state legislatures. We have seen a lot of hysterical pro-choice literature that ignores this point and
plays to the false fear that passage of the Hatch amendment would automatically prohibit abortion. If the
amendment did pass, the legislative struggle over abortion would be at its beginning, not its end.
It would be preferable if Roe v. Wade could be overturned by some means other than the Hatch amendment, but since that would seem to require the Supreme
Court to reverse itself on a major issue, the prospects
do not appear likely. Roe v. Wade has rightly come
under attack becau e of both its dubious moral substance and its tenuous constitutional logic, but it is
vulnerable on yet other grounds: the Court's decision
was premature in that it attempted to pronounce absolutely on a matter on which the community had not
arrived at a settled moral conviction.
We believe strongly that abortion on demand is
morally wrong, but we re pect the moral integrity of
those who believe otherwise. All the evidence indicate that the American people are deeply divided o·n
moral and political lines over the i ue. Given that
division it would have been better-sub tantive matters quite a ide-for the Court to avoid foreclo ing
further legislative debate on an is ue that would not
6

m n
arl _

ry

an i ue
matt r d finiIt didn t w rk out
of our : oppon nt
f lav ry refu ed to
accept th
alidit
f a d i ion th y found morall y
r pugnant and on titutionally untenabl . Rath r than
ttl a di puted ubj t, th Court in a ting inappropriat ly, onl inflam d public opinion th more.
o al o today. Abortion i not - or not yet- o contentiou an i ue with Am rican as slavery was but
the moral dynamic of the two issu are comparable.
Opponent of abortion have long tradition of law and
moral conviction on their ide, and they are not about
to give up their truggle because of one highly-questionable court decision. For now, Roe v. Wade is the
law of the land, but we support the effort of those in
all arenas who are working to change that.
Realistically, however, pro-life forces face unenviable odds. Given the lack of consensu on the abortion
issue, it is highly unlikely that supporters of the Hatch
amendment will be able to muster the two-thirds majorities in Congress nece sary to send the measure to the
state legi latures for ratification. We would argue that
it is unjust that the anti-abortion movement should
have to face so daunting a prospect. One of the very
good reasons why issues should be kept out of the Constitution unless absolutely necessary is that once embedded there they remain shielded forever after from
the simple majoritorian processes of democratic politics. When the Supreme Court acts on flimsy grounds
to remove an issue from the ordinary workings of the
political system, as it did in the abortion decision, it
invites contempt for itself and frustration with orderly
politics. People come to find it easy to justify civil
disobedience to themselves if they perceive that the
machinery of the political/judicial order is unfairly
rigged against them.
We began by suggesting that the Constitution hould
not lightly be tampered with. We end by urging a constitutional amendment on abortion on the ironic basis
that only thus, apparently can the earlier constitutional
mi chief wrought by the Con titution's chief guardians
be undone.
Cl
The Cresset

In Quest of Heroic Transcendence
The Significance of the
Thought of Ernest Becker

Frederick A. N iedner
It ha not b en all that Ion ince death came out of
the dos t, and th r ult i that more Americans are
dying than
r b for .
decade ago, people never
died in ho pital . Th y expired they passed away, or the
doctor lo t them but none of them ever died. Faithful
church memb r
ldom di d either. In tead, the Sunday bull tin would announce that a member of the
congregation had b en called home to receive his or
her great reward and thu had departed this vale of
tears. uch euphemi m are till used in American culture, but there are many more people dying today than
are being lost by doctors or are being called home.
Moreover, it is not only the language concerning death
which has changed; there is evidence that some fundamental attitude toward death within our culture have
been changing as well. For example, the last decade has
seen the rise of the in titution known as the hospice, a
place to which a per on can go for the ole purpose of
dying with as much dignity and as little pain as possible. Others whose deaths are not so imminent have
formed societies which pool resources and information
useful to survivors when a family member dies. In other
words, people are planning on dying and are using
forthright language with which to talk about that inevitable prospect.
Just why such a shift in our talking and thinking has
taken place is difficult to determine, though there are
surely definable reasons, and someday an enterprising
doctoral candidate will undoubtedly document them in
a dissertation. When the shift took place is less difficult to ascertain. The appearance on the best-seller
list of Elisabeth Kubler-Ross' On Death and Dying, first
published in 1970, must surely be a bit of evidence that
omething had changed in our culture's way of looking
at mortality as America entered the 1970s. What KublerRoss had done was to observe and then describe the

Frederick A. iedner is Assistant Professor of Theology al
Valparaiso University, where he has taught since 1973. He
earned his B.A. at Concordia Senior College in Fort Way ne,
Indiana, and received his Th.D. from Christ SeminarySeminex in St. Louis. He is co-author ( with David G.
Truemper) of Keeping the Faith: A Guide to the Chri tian Me age.
October, 19 '2

distinctive psychological stages (denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance) through which
terminally ill people progress as death approache .
The book's popularity seems to have been due, at least
in part, to the fact that it outlined a program by which
people could learn to ·c ope with and perhap even to
manage the range of emotions which surround that
most dreaded of human experience . The induction of
On Death and Dying into American popular culture,
and thus into the cultural p yche, wa eventually evidenced by the comedy routine based on it in the Bob
Fosse film All that Jazz in 1979.
What exactly the absorption of erious work into th
popular culture means is not altogether clear, but for
whatever reason , people were buying and r ading a
book about facing up to death. o longer w r the
topics of death and the fear of death the ol pr rv
of poet , noveli t , philo oph r
th olo ian
and
preachers or the un peakable truth b hind ubtle manipulation used in adv rti ing campaign ' ( 'You only
go around once in life, and you ve got to grab for all
the gusto you can!").

Stages of the Grieving Process
tudi d
p opl

a main prin
lar ly t a
b d n in

m

.,, a

that it i

7

Although it never made the best-seller charts, Becker's The Denial of Death won the Pulitzer
Prize and was eventually published in paperback, the sure sign of publishing success in America.

man .' Becker' work wa not in an , a gen rat d b.
Kubler-Ros ' tu die , nor was T he Denial of D eath a r sponse to On Death and Dy ing. B cker ' book i a th oretical synthe is of in ight from the o ial i nc
and theology not a handbook on the p chological management of terminal illness or grief. Like Kubler-Ro
however, Becker reached an a toni hingly wide au di enc
with a serious, scholarly work. Becker' win ome engaging style of argument made his heavy subject readable, the Pulitzer prize gained for hi book the attention
of people who care about such thing , and he wrote
and published at a time when Americans were already
thinking out loud about death. Although it never made
the best-seller charts, The Denial of Death was eventually
produced in paperback (the sure sign of publishing
success in America). It was widely reviewed and sessions were devoted to it at scholarly meetings such as
those of the American Academy of Religion. Becker,
too, found his way into the popular culture. Becker
fans and other careful viewers saw Woody Allen carrying around a paperback copy of The Denial of Death
during some scenes in Allen's 1977 Oscar Winner for
Best Picture, A nni"e Hall.
Although Becker's last publication appeared posthumously in 1975, his influence and impact have endured. The Denial of Death is no longer a cult object
in the media of popular culture, for Woody Allen and
his ilk have moved on to other things. Scholarly
meetings and conventions now only rarely include
papers and seminars on Becker's work. After all, four
or five years is a long time for the scholarly worldwhich lives by the publish-or-perish law of the academic
jungle- to maintain interest in anyone's theories and
ideas. Nevertheless, one cannot look through the index
of even the most recent publications on subjects related to death and the study of human nature without
finding Becker's name.
Ernest Becker was born Israel Becker to a Jewish
family in the United States in 1924. He enlisted in the
U.S. Army immediately upon graduation from high
school and saw duty during the last two years of World
War II. At the conclusion of the war, he remained in
Europe for several years and served on the staff of the
U.S. Embassy in Paris. He did not find life as a foreign
service staffer fulfilling, however. The experience of
war had left him obsessed with a question which was to
remain with him for the rest of his life. He wanted to
know what made human beings tick, why people acted
the way they did.
After returning to the United States he received an
undergraduate degree in psychology and in 1960 a
Ph.D. in cultural and social anthropology from Syracuse University. Becker found that psychology and
anthropology did not totally enable him to answer his
8

Syracuse, Berkeley, Frisco, Vancouver
After earning hi doctorat B ck r joined the faculty
at Syracu e and taught th re until 1965. From yracu e
he went to th
niver ity of California at B rkeley ,
where he wa a vi iting lecturer in ociology and anthropology. By some accounts Becker was the teacher at
Berkeley during the two tumultuous years he pent
there. Hi dramatic, passionate lectures and the ability
to integrate a variety of disciplines into his thinking
made him omething of a hero to the tudents. His
willingness to side with students against the school's
administration on the heated issues of the mid-60s ,
however, re ulted in the non-renewal of his contract
in 1967. Two thousand students signed petitions demanding that Becker be retained, but the administration refused to reconsider. The students countered by
voting to spend 13,000 of student body funds in order
to keep Becker on as a visiting scholar. Academics today
can only marvel at such a turn of events. Becker, however, declined the students' offer and moved on to teach
social psychology at San Francisco State, where at the
time S. I. Hayakawa was the resident keeper of law and
order. The turmoil of that setting was more than Becker
could tolerate. He found the scene exciting and again
involved himself in student interests, but he found
that in the midst of such turmoil he could no longer do
the serious and careful scholarly work which was his
first professional love. In a move that was at least partially symbolic of sympathy for the draft resisters during
the Viet Nam era, Becker went in 1969 to Simon Fraser
University in Vancouver, and there, while teaching in a
department of political science, sociology, and anthropology, he found the setting which allowed him to set
about the task of writing what he hoped would be his
magnum opus, a two-volume capstone to an already remarkable record of scholarly publishing.
The Denial of Death was published in 1973. However,
while he was working on the final stages of its sequel,
Escape from Evil, Becker learned that he had terminal
cancer. He ultimately ran out of the strength needed
to put Escape from Evil into the shape that would have
atisfied him, so he asked his wife to leave it unpubli hed. Becker died in 1974, only a few day before being
The Cresset

Becker conclu~es tha~ hu"!an beings seek pleasure in order to make life worth living, in order to
feel m ore genumely alive, m order to avoid a condition in which one might just as well be dead.
named a Pulitzer Priz winner for the The Denial of
Death. Hi wife Mari at fir t left the manuscript of
EscapefromEvilin her hu band' desk drawer untouched,
but friends eventually persuaded her to allow its publication. It app ared in 1975, and whereas The Denial of
Death had focu ed almost exclusively upon the dynamics
of the fear of death within the individual, Escape from
Evil spelled out the social consequences of those dynamics. The two works together do, indeed, represent a
magnum opus and, a it turns out, a fitting capstone to
a brilliant but all-too-brief career.
Either of the two works can be read and understood
without reference to the other, but they are meant to
be taken as a single argument. Together they represent
a look at humanity which is broader in scope than anyone has previously attempted. He has looked at human
beings through the eyes of the famous (Hobbes, Rousseau, Kierkegaard, Marx, Freud, Luther, Tillich, and
Buber) and the not-so-famous (Otto Rank, A. M. Hocart, Norman 0. Brown, and a host of others). He has
stood upon all of their shoulders, peered into the mysteries of human motivation, and produced a synthesis
of insights into human nature which can be studied
profitably by all who care to understand themselves
and their world more fully.
In The Denial of Death, Becker begins his analysis
of what makes people tick by looking first at the work
of Freud. Freud had said that it was the pursuit of
pleasure which motivated human beings. The story
of a human life was the story of the pleasure-seeking
id and the inhibiting super-ego fighting for the form
and control of the ego. Freud had also suggested what
others such as Erik Erikson later spelled out in detail ,
that the balancing act which the ego undertakes progresses through oral, anal, and genital stages. Becker
asks of Freud and the Freudians, however, why people
seek pleasure at all. What is the value of pleasure, or
its meaning? Furthermore, why is there such interest
in pleasure which is related to anality and the genitalia?
In brief, Becker concludes that human beings seek
pleasure in order to make life worth living, in order
to feel more genuinely alive, in order to avoid a condition in which one might just as well be dead. The real
problem with such states as boredom and loneliness is
that life in such conditions is not real life. It represents
death. Becker argues that people learn the significance
of the quest for real living in such things as anality and
sexuality. The sexual experience teaches a person the
various heights of purely physical pleasure and continually reminds one of his or her existence as a body,
but it also provides one with a sense of intimacy which
transcends the physical. As for anality, one quickly
learns in this world that the stuff which the body exOctober, 1982

cretes stinks, and others, beginning with one's parents,
do not want that stuff around. The anus teaches its
owner that he or she is a part of a world in which animals such as himself or herself are required for the sake
of survival to kill, eat, and excrete other animals. Moreover, it does not take long to deduce that the living
owner of an anus will inevitably end up on the dung
heap as well. Becker calls human beings "angels with
anuses." They are creatures acutely aware of their
creatureliness, but at the same time they have experienced something of a transcendence of creatureliness.

Nothing but Fancy Food for Worms
The resulting condition is a state of anxiety over
the fact that despite the delicacy of human emotion,
intellect, imagination , and compassion, the human
being is in the end nothing more than fancy food for
worms. The paradox is too much to bear. Becker sums
up this truth of the human condition with the term
"fundamental expendability." Despite everything, it
will finally make no difference that any one of us ever
lived. The world will go on without us, and our individual lives will appear to have meant nothing.
In order to cope with this reality, humankind has
devised a comprehensive system by which to deny it.
That system is what generally goes by the name "culture." It is a system in which people play roles , do jobs,
perform duties, and make contribution to society. All
of this, says Becker, borrowing a page out of Kierkegaard, is an organized attempt to "tranqu ilize ourselves with trivia" in order to deny fundam ntal expendability or else to forget about it for the ake of
sanity.
Becker arrives at thi view by ynthe izing th work
of Kierkegaard and the work of tto Rank, one of
Freud's early di ciple in the cho I of p y h analysis. Kierkegaard had aid that mankind' natural condition was characterized by anxiety, terr r, and dr ad.
Rank's greatest contribution t th fi ld f p ych analysi was hi work on the ph n m non known a
"transference." In brief, tran f r n
may b d fin d
as a universal phenomenon in p y hoth rapy in which
the patient or client b gin to
hi r h r wh 1 lif
in relationship to th th rapi t. rucial I m nt , both
po itive and n gative f all of th . ignifi ant r lati nship which on ha had pre i u I b
m tran ,f rr d
to the pati nt-therapi t relation hip and th pati nt
begins to determin th m aning and valuati n f his r
her lif within that r lati n hip. B k r draw th
two viewpoint tog th r and th n him If argu
that
the uni er al human r sp n t th anxi t and dr ad
of lif i · to lo k form aning and orth within r lati n-

Most human beings manage to find a system of relationships in which meaning a nd value are
established, and most do work they believe is significant enough to make them unique or h eroic .

hip with oth r .
pecifically human
tri e f r r lation hip
in which the are irr pla eabl and in that wa , th
hope to avoid being fundam ntall
p ndabl . M reover, human being attempt to produ
" ith
their hand and mind which are irrepla eabl contributions. Such thing will live on in ignificanc b ond
their creator d ath and th y will r pre nt their
creator uniquene . Becker term for one who ha
achieved uch relation hips and product i "the hero.'
Heroi m is the e tabli hment of one' own meaning
and value and thus the effective denial of death's ul timacy.

Can We Shake the Fear of Death?
Most human beings manage rather well to find a
sy tern of relation hip in which meaning and value
are established, and most do work they believe is significant enough to make them unique or heroic. Some,
however, are never able to shake the fear of death and
its attendant anxiety. That is, they are always aware
of the fact that what they are doing is mere tranquilization with trivia. They suspect and fear that neither
their friends, lovers, therapists, contributions to society, nor works of art can really give their lives meaning
or value. They are thus driven to activities and conditions in which they become unproductive or participate
in abnormal behavior, all because they cannot shake
the truth of their own fundamental expendability. They
live in terror of their environment or devise fetishes
in order to reduce reality to an area small enough to be
manageable. Becker points to an irony when describing
this kind of response to mortality. One common definition of mental illness is the inability to see reality,
but it is really the neurotic and psychotic people who
cannot avoid looking at the specter of reality, while
it is the productive and tranquilized-with-trivia members of ociety who have succes fully blinded themselves
to reality. The "healthy" and productive live with what
B cker call the "vital lie" of their heroism. It is a lie
becau e death i still the ultimate destiny for any person,
but it i vital because one can scarcely go on living
without it.
There are om obviou implications in Becker's
argument for the various "helping professions." Such
popular p ychological program a
elf-realization,
tran actional anal i , and exi tentialist therapy can
really do little more than tinker with minor maladjust:m nt in the vital lie. In view of the· ultimate reality
of death there i really no uch thing a self-realization
a per on cannot really be "OK" unle s it i OK to b
food for worm and life may in fact not demand anything of a p r on.
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. 1 implirtant f

in" om n B k r
bolic of b th mal
pr
nitor th ir own fath r . That i
that th phenom n n Fr ud call d p ni n y mu t not
b eparated from th O dipal pr j t in whi h boys
att mpt to tak the pla
of th ir fath r . What do
it mean to att mpt to b on ' own father? It i , argues
Becker, the fir t tep in a lif long att mpt to gain ultimate control o er on ' lif and al o one' death. People really want to b their own cau of exi tence and
therefore to deny d ath of it pow r. B cker names
this d ire and the attempt to fulfill it "the causa sui
project."
Theologically considered, what does it mean to attempt a causa sui project? What doe it mean to attempt
to make a life for one elf, to be one's own creator, to
take charge of redeeming one's own life from situations
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Reading The ~enial of Dea th is like going through therapy and then having the therapy cut off
just at the po,nt when all of th e defenses have been stripped away and some rebuilding is necessary.

in which on i a g d a dead? Thi attempt, which
is natural b havior according to Becker, is at least a
part of what Chri tian th ologian have traditionally
called original in. That i , it really is true that all
human being are born a one who will by nature strive
to be their own creator and redeemers. And if there is
a God who claims tho e roles for himself, then it is not
merely a theological creation ex nihilo to say that human
beings are by nature the competitors and even the enemies of God. If Becker is right, it is quite literally and
empirically true and verifiable.

Of Sin, Neurosis, and Fetishism
Becker also speaks of that which is sometimes referred
to as actual sin (as distinct from original sin). Becker
argues that what the Judaeo-Christian tradition has
understood to be "sin" is virtually the same as that
which goes by the name "neurosis" in the language of
psychology. Neurosis is the human attempt to narrow
down reality and to say that only this or that much of
life really makes any difference. In both sin and neurosis one fetishizes himself or herself on $Omething
narrow at hand and pretends that the whole meaning
and miraculousness of creation is limited to that and
one can get one's beatification from that. This results
in the isolation of the individual and in the person's
disharmony with the rest of nature. Some sort of reconciliation is necessary because the causa sui project has
as its logical and inevitable conclusion the total alienation of human beings from one another and from nature.
Thus, for Becker, both sin and neurosis represent the
same thing. The individual blows himself or herself
up to larger than true size and refuses to recognize his
or her cosmic dependence. Both are attempts to force
nature, to pretend that the causa sui project really
suffices.
According to Becker, a human being's only hope for
genuine heroism is to cast his or her meaning upon
someone who can bear it, and only the creator can bear
it because, unlike the lover or the therapist, the creator
is immortal. What people need if they are to live without
paralyzing ,anxiety and dread is something which
Becker sees as being provided by a proper synthesis
of psychology and religion. People must be helped to
see the lie which they are living in the face of reality,
and they must be helped to stare genuine reality, as
ugly and frightening as it is, squarely in the face. Moreover, they must cast their meaning upon the creator
and give up the causa sui project as their ultimate remedy for the problem of mortality. To stand mortal
and naked before oneself and one's creator, that is
genuine heroism.
October, 1982

In his keynote address at the 1982 Institute of Liturgical Studies at Valparaiso University, Thomas Droege
commented that reading The Denial of Death is something like going through therapy and then having the
therapy cut off just at the point when all of the defenses
have been stripped away and some rebuilding is necessary. That is a perceptive assessment. One cannot read
this book without being moved and even changed.
Some critics, however, have argued that Becker was
only descriptive and not prescriptive, that he unnecessarily leaves his readers hanging. The criticism is
partially understandable. No one enjoys being stripped
and left naked, especially before oneself. In theological
terms, one would have to admit that Becker does not
really offer his readers "good news." In fact, he admits,
as he concludes that the only solution to the human
predicament is to cast one's meaning upon the creator,
that what one can know of the creator from nature itself
is plainly frightening. The creator seems to have an appetite for panic, terror, and tragedy, and Becker offers
no contrary evidence which might indicate that the
creator is in fact trustworthy. But providing that kind
of evidence is not so much Becker's burden as it i the
burden of the church and the synagogue as they tell of
the Christian gospel and the story of God's faithfulness to Israel.
The Denial of Death can be profoundly u eful to tho e
in the church and synagogue who are charged with
telling the stories of their faith. Inasmuch as the proclamation of good news is a prognosi which is closely
linked with a diagnosis of the human condition, B cker'
work assists the preacher in arriving at a genuinely
radical diagnosis, and thus it urges the preach r to
proclaim a gospel which peaks mor fully and appositely to the human condition. B ck r's work al o tand ·
as a reminder to tho e who do coun ling what th
stakes really are when a person de ribes hi or her
problems and dilemmas. It even a si t one to p ak
meaningfully of life and death with little hildren.
According to Becker, children arc awar of and frightened by the paradoxical nature of th ir crcatur lines
much earlier than adult gen rally r aliz , and wh n,
for example, they ask wher babi
om from, th y
are not so much inquiring into biol gical pro s
and the mechanics of ·ex a th y ar a king what it
mean to be and to hav ab dy in th first pla .
Finally, The Denial of Death i imp rtant b
it is perhaps the be t curr nt tat m nt
standing of death that d minat
m l rn ultur .
Whether on op rat
n i u ly " ith a Fr udian
world view or whether n i m r ly a fun ti nal
ulari t who e languag about d ath and ultimat r ality i r ally a t f mb I whi h ar b rr w d fr m
another ag and whi h ar r all m ant l an w r
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Becker argues that human beings and societies cannot give up the mentality of competition
and warfare, for that would be to concede to death, the ultimate evil and the ultimate enemy.

que tion no longer b ing a k d toda B ck r an a sist one to see and under tand today' que tion on th
subject of human mortality. Becker call hi r ad r
to be about the bu ines of an wering tho qu tion
with hone ty, integrity, and a commitment to makin
the good new of the Judaeo-Christian tradition p ak
meaningfully to the mortals of today.
In Escape from Evil Becker takes hi place among the
most notable thinkers who have sought to explain why
individual human beings join together into ocietie
and why those societies then act as they do. Hobbe had
said that individuals were by nature power- eeking
bodies who were continually engaged, at lea t when isolated, in a war of all against all. As a result, uncivilized
human beings are dangerous to one another and do not
produce commerce, industry, or technology. In his
famous summary statement, Hobbes commented that
"the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short." In order to be free from the fear
of violent death in the natural state of constant war,
people unite into commonwealths, turn over their individual powers to a ruler, and thus can live in relative peace and safety.

Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, and Freud
In his famous (or infamous, depending upon one's
perspective) Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Rousseau had argued in direct opposition to Hobbes. It was
civilization, he said, which had introduced competition
and war among humans and had corrupted the noble,
unselfish savages that isolated individuals really are
by nature. Private ownership, which brought with it
the desire to accumulate wealth and to protect the
ownership of that wealth, was the root of all evil. Marx
would later build upon Rousseau's argument as he
fashioned a highly optimistic, and some would say
frightfully naive, theory of human nature and society
which forms the basis of the ideology by which over
half the world's population is presently governed.
Still later, Freud explained human beings' individual
and corporate behavior in a way which is much more
akin to Hobbes' thought than to Rousseau's. Within
every individual there exists the pleasure- and powerseeking force which Freud called the id. The id seeks
to impose its will upon the individual's ego, which is
the rational element of the human psyche, but the ego
is subject to other pressures, too. The ego fears th~
potential destruction which might result were some of
the id's suggestions acted upon, and in addition the ego
is continuously held accountable before the super-ego,
which is essentially the sum total of all the "Thoushalt-not" statements that have been recorded by the
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natur . Rath r i ilization wa natural
and human b in a a oup could b tru ted to hold
the unrul fore within th m lve in ch k.
Becker both a re
and di agr
with th e four
thinker who ha e dominat d modern analy i of humanity's indi idual and corporate natur . With Hobbes
and Freud he argue again t the cont ntion of Rouseau and Marx that evil is a perpetration of ocieties
and not of individuals. Individual , according to
Becker, are in a con tant individual quest for more
life, that i , for mor power and pleasure and they
need not be in a society before they will diminish or
even end the lives of others in the service of that quest.
However, with Rous eau and Marx, Becker argues
against the impression left by Freud and Hobbes that
human beings actually set out to do evil for the sake of
sheer pleasure. Becker argues-and this is the thesis
of Escape from Evil-that what human beings actually
set out to do, both as individuals and as groups, is to
rid the world of evil and ultimately of evil's outcome,
death. Every individual wants to be the hero, or a member of the heroic society, which has in some way conquered the forces which threaten life. The problem,
however, is that the forces which threaten life are generally identified with rival individuals or societies,
and thus the most natural activity of humankind proves
to be either war or preparation for war. Moreover,
Becker argues that human beings and societies cannot
give up the mentality of competition and warfare, for
that would be to concede to death, the ultimate evil
and the ultimate enemy.
Becker refused to apologize to his readers in the
preface of this, his last book, for the "relative grimness" of much of the thought that it contains. He maintains that he wrote as a pessimist, not a cynic. Both the
cynic and the pessimist are realistic, says Becker, as
they confront the evidence by which one must evaluate
the human condition. The difference is that the cynic
has given up hope, while the pessimist has not. Becker
wrote and died without giving up hope for the future
of humankind.
According to Becker, every human culture is a religious enterprise. That is, it is within human culture
or society that individuals receive assurance of their
The Cresset

A thle!ic contests _b~tween members of a society are not played just for fun. Winners at any
ritualized compet,t,on represent a superior life force. Losers at anything embody the moribund.

individual id ntit
m anm
and value. Individual
member of group b Ii ve that their group has some
unique gra p up n what pre erve and sanctifies life.
Together th gr up m mber are heroes. Among the
religiou trapping which ocieties exhibit are the
rituals by which they act out and reassure themselves
of their corporat heroi m. They ritually pick and obey
leaders who mbody their heroism and they attribute
to their leader sup rhuman power and intelligence.
Leaders are vi ible god and an absolute necessity to
any group. ocietie al o ritualize competition, either
among themselve or between themselves and representatives of rival systems of heroism. Thus, all wars are
holy wars, tests conducted by societies who want to see if
their heroic, life-giving powers are still uniquely
potent. Moreover , athletic contests between members of a society are not played just for fun. Winners
at any ritualized competition, be it athletic, military,
political, economic, romantic, or academic, along with
their supporters, represent a superior heroism and life
force. Losers at anything embody the moribund. It is
no wonder that Great Britain had no choice but to prove
its heroism in the Falklands war. Nor is it any surprise
that there are dances in the streets and ticker-tape
parades when a city's or nation's team wins the World
Series, the Super Bowl, or the World Cup. The victory
has been over death, not merely over another city,
country, university, or team.

Expiating the Double-Bind Guilt
The other major religious task which is carried out
by societies, according to Becker, is the expiation of
guilt. Becker identifies two separate but related sources
of individual guilt, one being excessive personal failure
and the other excessive personal success. People who do
not live up to their potentials, who fail to protect their
families from harm or death, who by carelessness or
sheer accident hurt others unintentionally, all experience a burden of guilt. They have negatively affected
the fates of others. They have failed as heroes. They
have met the representatives of death and death has
prevailed. Ironically, however, the heroic victor over
death has his or her own burden of guilt to bear. The
hero has had to prevail over others in order to prove
his or her heroism and has left bodies not unlike his or
her own in the battlefield. The hero's head always
sticks out too far and becomes a target for headhunters.
Other potential heroes must now have his or her head ,
evered from its body, of course , if they are to succeed
at their own quest for life.
It is ociety which must somehow cope with the terrible bind in which all would-be heroe , damned if they
October. 1982

succeed and damned if they do not, find themselves
caught. A society is strong and successful even if the
individual fails or is ineffective as a hero, and thus the
society can bear the guilt of the unheroic. In order to
expiate the guilt of those who are heroic and whose
heads stick out too far as a result, societies of every
kind provide a system of sacrifice by which the guilt
of heroism is borne. In primitive societies the most
wealthy members compete at gift-giving and offer portions of their wealth to the gods. In more modern societies the successful are taxed more heavily and they
are expected to make "contributions to society" beyond
what can be required of other mere mortals. It even
seems that the common .folk expect the successful and
the heroic to pay for having their heads stuck out so
far by experiencing the diseases and maladies of the
successful, namely, ulcers , heart attacks, and high
suicide rates.
The most dangerous method by which societies cope
with guilt, according to Becker, is the practice of capegoating. When a whole society begins to suspect that its
heroism is failing, a situation that easily arise when,
for example, a nation experiences economic problems
or loses a war, the blame for the failure mu t b fixed
and the responsible party or parties eliminated. Again,
to neglect removal of those responsible for the failure
of heroism is to risk or even in ure certain death
beneath the collapse of the heroic y tern. Ancients
sometimes switched god after a defeat. Other have
accomplished thi nece ary ta k by ymbolically banning forever from the community an animal or p rson.
Most societies, however, have depo d or a a inat d
their leaders or have fixed the blame for th ir problems upon some recognizable el m nt, u ually a minority, within their own group and have pro cl d to liminate them.
ot surpri ingly, Beck r point to th
Nazis' slaughter of the J w and oth r "und irable
elements" a the mo t comprehen iv and h rrible incidence of scapegoating which th world ha
t
Becker would argue that Hit! r a atro i u
program for the futur turn d ut to b , did not
to do evil. Though delu l d, h ought through
nocide to rid the world of d ath and f th
vii whi
brings death. uch i th iron of humankind in
ety, according to Beck r.
If Becker i a proph t, ther 1 ·
concerned for th w 11-b ing and
humanity. If the nit d 'tat '
flounder there ar lik l t b
identify th culprit and ap g at th m.
expect to
th air ad
id nt · mpt m
goating e alat . Mor ill gal ali n will b
up and d ported m r Japan . 'aut · will b
d,
and p rhap e n Japan
aut mak r and d al r
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Ernest Becker's books ultimately present themselve
a pl , a c II form n and women to
equip themselves for the work of brutally-honest critici m of them elve and th ir ocieties.

ut
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cannot
n pro en in r cent m mo
r entine and Briti h in th Falkland b the
the
Moreover, if Becker i correct, th r i littl rea on to
believe that an nation or ociet i immune from u h
irre istable temptations.

How Shall We Escape from Evil?
What pro pect does Becker, a pessimist, to be ure,
but no cynic, hold out for humanity's escape from evil,
particularly in the nuclear age when the smalle t demonstration of heroism could erupt into the ultimate
conflagration? Becker's prescription for nations and
societies is very much like that offered to individuals.
For individuals Becker prescribed a combination of
psychology and a recovery of a sense of religious transcendence which together would allow people to look
honestly at themselves and their mortality and to cast
their meaning, identities, and value upon the creator
rather than trying, with such devastating results, to be
their own gods and heroes. As for nations, their citizens must resi t the temptation to see their leaders as
visible gods. Nor can leaders allow themselves to be
deluded into playing that role.
But how can this be avoided, so that people in a society will look to something beyond the myth of their
society's own heroism for a redemption of meaning,
value, and real life? Becker does not advocate establishment of national religions in which citizens would
be required to worship a transcendent deity. Instead,
he argue that nation and societies can only avoid
being dangerous to themselves and to others if they are
willing to engage in free, open self-criticism which is
suspicious of any and all utopian dreams and the rhetoric which clothe them. Becker suggests that genuine
democracies have the best chance of avoiding the pitfalls of phony heroism and death denial. He argues:
Yet, democracy doe encroach on utopia a little bit, becau e it
already addre ed it elf to the problem of my tification by fr e flow
of elf-criticism. We could carry the utopian mu ings further and
ay that the gauge of a truly free ociety would be the extent to which
it admitted its own central fear of death and que tioned its own
ystem of heroic tran cendence-and thi i preci ely what democ-
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Sam Keen, Becker wa a k d to evaluate the
cance of hi work. He re ponded:

ignifi-

That' ea y enough.
far as my work i concerned . I think its
major thrust i in th direction of creating a m rger of cience and
the religiou p r pective. I want to how that if you get an accurate
scientific picture of the human condition, it coincides exactly with
the religious understanding of human nature. Thi is something Paul
Tillich wa working on but didn't achiev becau e he was working
from the direction of theology . The problem is to work from th e
direction of science. If I have anything that I can rub my hands
together in glee about in the quiet hours and say , 'Tee hee, this is
what I have pulled off,' I think I have delivered the science of man
over to a merger with theology . (Psycholoff1-J Today, April 1974 .
p. 71.)

Whether Becker's plea will be answered and whether
the merger he achieved will bear fruit depends upon
whether there will continue to be scholars willing to
work on the synthesis of religion and the social sciences. Such synthesizers, at least the real ones- not
psychologists who golf with a rabbi or theologians who
have read I'm OK - You 're OK - are a rare breed. American academe does not produce them in great numbers
because narrow specialization is what generates publication and what attracts federal and foundation funds,
and upon those things depend the urvival of academic
departments and their faculties. Yet, Becker's plea can
still be heard, and some still respond with energy and
insight. If Becker is correct, such thinkers and their
students might be all that stand between humanity and
a multitude of wasted lives and perhaps a world holocaust. That is a dra tic statement. Becker's work tend
to make his reader say apocalyptic things and speak
in hyperbole. But if Becker ha een truly the heart
of humankind the stakes are indeed that high.
Cl
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And Jehoshaphat stood in the
assembly of Judah and Jerusalem,
in the house of the Lord, before
the new court, and said, "O Lord,
God of our fathers, art thou not
God in heaven? Dost thou not rule
over all the kingdoms of the
nations? In thy hand are power
and might, so that none is able to
withstand thee ... . And now
behold, the men of Ammon and Moab
and Mount Seir, whom thou wouldest
not let Israel invade when they
came from the land of Egypt, and
whom they avoided and did not
destroy-behold, they reward us by
coming to drive us out of thy
possession, which thou hast given
us to inherit. 0 our God, wilt
thou not execute judgment upon
them? For we are powerless against
this great multitude that is coming
against us. We do not know what t o
do, but our eyes are upon thee ."

IN I
Repeatedly the words of Jehoshaphat's cry from the
depths of his soul , "God, we do not know what to do,
but our eyes are upon thee," have echoed in my mind.
This prayer provided the text for a striking sermon
preached by Dietrich Bonhoeffer in May, 1932. Only
a moment's reflection on that date reminds us of the
sense of uncertainty and foreboding which had fallen
on the preacher and the congregation. And many of
us feel that we live in a similar situation today. We
experience a sense of personal and social crisis, and we
are uncertain what to do.
The king's prayer is an unusual one. He was a man of
action. These are not the words of a theologian or philosopher reflecting on the finitude of human knowledge.
Jehoshaphat was not thinking in general terms at all. He
faced a very specific crisis situation. And he did not
know what to do. Yet, he had to decide and he had to
act. We are accustomed to quite different expressions
from both political and ecclesiastical leaders. We await
the presentation of a clear program of action with an
appeal to prayer at the end. And the prayer takes the
form, Lord, we know what to do, we ask your help in
doing it. We can almost hear the re ponse some would
make to the king's prayer today: If you don't know what
to do, why don't you step aside and giv place to someone who does?
Certainly not everyone ha a right to pray in thi
fashion. And there may be time when no one has a
right to pray these words. ot every mo~al deci i~n
is unclear. There are times wh n uncertamty ha 1t
roots only in our unwillingne to ee. What need to
be done may be obvious, but we h itate b cau e th
required action appears threatening to u . Or, it may
prove hurtful to people who e live are v ry do ely
bound to our own and we do n t wi h th m harm. nd
we may have expre ed our Ive o fore fully in th
past that now to act diff rently would prov
mbarrassing. To pray the word in u h a mom nt w uld
only inten ify our blindn ·s. e hav to pray L rd ,
take away the fal e loyaltie whi h prev nt m from
seeing what i obviou .

11 Chronicles 20:5-6, 10- 12

Dale Lasky is Professor of Theology at
Valparaiso University. This sermon was
preached in the Gloria Christi Chapel at
Valparaiso on June 18, 1982 at the end of a
week-long seminar sponsored by the Center for
the Study of Campus Ministry on "Marxism,
Democratic Capitalism, and the Church. '
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that I ma
n

rtaint ma al · b r

t

l in

ur
15

Politics requires choice, and we cannot always be certain our choices are the right ones. We can
only give our reasons for the decisions we must make and then place the judgment in God's hands .

a point of view we con ider wron . E
tim \·\' fa
the problem at hand, w ar o pr oc upi d with d monstrating the inadequac of the prop d olution
that we end up being def n ive or even p 1 mi al.
We pour so much energy into proving an an w r fal
that we have little left to earch for a po iti e olution.
We can only pra , Lord bring me back to th need
which must be met and to the hurt that mu t b nded.
Finally, our confusion may lie in the d ire for a
perfect solution. We cannot live with ambiguity. hat
we really seek is an escape from the confu ing ituation
we confront to a dream world of perfection.
e have
to come back to the actual problem we must re olve. e
pray, Lord, give me courage to accept ambiguity and
insight to do the possible.
Yet, the times do come when we stand open to insight
and direction and still land in confusion. We see no acceptable solution, but we do have to make a decision.
We cannot step aside into our famous Lutheran quietism. We have to act and we have to act now. We speak
our prayer, "Lord, we do not know what to do, but our
eyes are upon thee." The moment the prayer is finished,
however, we know that we shall have to choose.
Jehoshaphat received an answer to his prayer through
the prophet Jahaziel, the son of Zechariah. God delivered Israel by allowing the nation's enemies to destroy one another, and the victory was so great that the
people spent three days gathering the spoil of battle.
We have our own prophet, yes, one who is greater than
a prophet. In Christ, however, we not only have a different answer to our prayer, we also discover that we
must pray quite differently. No people today could
voice the body of Jehoshaphat's prayer without being
guilty of the "chosen nation" syndrome.
We pray, "O Lord, God of our fathers and mothers,
are you not God in heaven? In your hand are power
and might, so that no one is able to withstand you.
Did you not unfrock the cosmic powers and principalitie , making a public pectacle of them leading
them captive in triumphal procession? Did you not
give a new creation to ev ry per on in Chri t and promi e thi inheritance to every generation? And your
people have lived in thi good world and let themelves be named in Chri t. If evil come , if life or death
threat ns, or height or depth, or anything el e in all
creation we come together in hi name, for your Spirit
i pre ent and will you not ave u when we cry to you?
nd now b hold the tructur
of government the
power of production the ocial w b you would not
1 t u destro in your name reward u b threatening
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not r
th qu tion
v h ther th man , ho approa h d J u had a valid
complaint a ain t th broth r who failed to divide the
family propert with him. ft r all o tou n
has
been uprooted and p opl hav d cided that it i wrong
to take their ea with the large
of nature, the question remain what to do with uch a que tion of rights
and ju tice. We till have to a k whether th re are
time when tho e who follow J e us may al o be uncertain how to judge or arbitrate a dispute.
Perhap we can find a parallel to our dilemma concerning economic systems in the counsel of a German
theologian to doctors who asked the resolution of a
medical question. Th issue was the old and painful
one of how to choose when a doctor must decide between the life of a mother or her newborn child. To
some the answer may be clear. But the theologian refused to provide a clear-cut solution. The doctors protested, do we then stand in danger of being guilty of
taking a life? The painfully rendered answer was yes.
A choice has to be made. You can only give your reasons
for the decision you must make and then place the
judgment in the hands of God. But who stands in a
position to state with certainty that the decision is the
right one and that no evil will be done? So we stand in
need of the grace to act decisively, resolutely, and effectively without demanding the approval of others.
For we might be asking an approval no one has the
right to give. We have to learn that faith in the grace
of God is no empty deception.
This is still not the final word. The king's prayer
was a prayer of hope, of hope which finds its fullness
in the Christ of the cro s and the resurrection. In his
recent volume On Being a Christian and a Lawyer, Thomas
Shaffer suggests that Christians need to learn to use
power with the skill which is derived from hope. We can
learn from tho e whose live were hopeful, not simply
whether to hope, but how to hope. As you well know,
hope cliff rs from optimi m in that optimi m can exist
without truth. nd optimi m da hed oon turn into
c nici m. Both the hop ful per on and the cynic have
learned how to tand back from their engagements·
The Cresset

The experience of grace and the power of hope
become ours palpably in the eucharistic meal.

but cyni j m till th imagination against the possible
and thu prot t the cynic without requiring that he
be truthful. Th yni abandon the burden of deciding
what i tru and what i ' not by refusing to believe in
anything. Cyni i m leads to de pair, which is the condition in which one no longer looks for alternatives.
To live by hope i to refuse to live by power. Albert
Camus once aid that "the truth is that every intelligent man dreams of being a gangster and ruling society
by force alone." By contrast, hope varies inversely with
the absoluteness of one's trust in power. At the same
time, hope produces skill. The hopeful way to deal with
power is to apply the arts of mind, to meet power with
analysis and knowledge. We may ask to what degree
Jesus' ability to outwit his opponents lay in the skill
grounded in his hope of the kingdom. We can study
the skill of hope embodied in the life of a Martin Luther,
a Martin Luther King, Jr., or a Mother Theresa. And
it is for us to embody this skill that others may learn
from us.
The experience of grace and the power of hope by
which we live become ours palpably in the eucharist
we celebrate together. We celebrate this sacrament
with bread and wine, the products of human hands
intertwined with the social and economic structures
in which we live. At this moment, no one can guarantee
that the wine grapes were not sprayed with pesticides
harmful to the biological chain of life. Nor do we know
whether those who harvested the grapes received a just
and equitable wage. We do not know whether the truck
which delivered the wine was equipped with adequate
pollution control technology. And who can guarantee
that the wholesaler who sold it does not live by the
dictum "accumulate, accumulate"? It is the Jesus of the
unholy cross who promises to be with us here that we
may live and hope in our world. And his promise gives
us eyes to recognize and to celebrate with those who
seek to shape their lives by the pattern of the new
creation.

Walking with my Sons in Early Spring

The wind off the lake is still
a winter's wind - cold
from behind the clouds. No sun.
Yet here we pretend it's spring
while the slow rain pelts our faces
and echoes the lake on the rocks.
The dog becomes our symbol,
running circles as if to bring alive
the pieces of wood wound up along the shore
unraveled now before us in the Indian Brush.
Behind us, snow packed joint
hinge the shoreline, and my sonall of five-claims this place and time
right for a show. We watch the cinema
from his wallet: bears, spacemen , gran.
His brother, two year now, point to ea,
and with gutteral acclamations turn
offering his hand in Virginia R I.
w,
as three Japanese ladies , we begin
the hundred small steps
up the hill home.

Travis Du Priest

We began our week with the prayer of Jehoshaphat
in the hymn sung in the opening devotion:
Make clear our path. that we may see
Where we must walk to be with thee
And ever Ii ten for thy voice.
That we may make thy way our choice .

This might seem only a coincidence, but I suspect that
this hymn was chosen because its prayer runs through
our lives. And having prayed, we will then take the
steps that have to follow from our praying. We live by
the hope that God will make those tep part of hi
greater and larger way and that finally we may realize
the hope to which we are called.
Cl
October. 1982
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-Purpose, Choice, and Punishment

Another Look at the Insanity Defense

Richard Stith
(Editor 's 'ate: Last month Th
re t publi hed The
Insanit Defense: Guilt; by Reason of Hinckle 1? by Professor Bruce Bemer. i hat follows is Professor tith response to that article.}

s

Profe or Bern r ha argued cogent! h o c ntral
point : that the in anit defen e ought to b retain d
and that hi propo al i the be t ver ion of the d fen e.
Re ponding eriall , I would agree that the defense
hould be retained if in fact it is nece ary in order to
keep the idea of moral culpability in the law. I take
Profe or Berner s argument to be roughly that moral
culpability depends on the idea of purposeful choice,
while insanity includes the absence of purpose or choice.
Therefore, it is contradictory to hold someone morally
culpable if in fact he was in ane at the time of his act.
Now there are two ways to resolve a contradiction;
one can let go of either one of the two principles in conflict. Professor Berner seems most worried that we will
retain the idea of moral condemnation while forgetting
the non-culpability of the insane-so that we end up
cruelly stigmatizing someone who is in fact innocent.
I am not so much disturbed by this possibility, for
reasons I explain below. Rather, I am worried that the
abolition of the insanity defense will serve as a precedent for the severance of law from morality, and thus
of what is de facto punishment from justice. That is ,
it may well be argued that if we can lock up (or even
execute) non-culpable insane people, why can't we
imprison other categories of persons (e.g., restless unemployed teenagers) who do not really deserve punishment whenever it is ocially useful to do so? (Of course,
involuntary civil commitment already confines people
who don't deserve moral condemnation, but in my
opinion this fact makes it a potentially more· tyrannical
device than the criminal law. And a marriage of the
two-in which non-culpable persons could be confined
for some fixed period rather than treated until curedwould be the mo t dangerou of all.)

Richard Stith is Professor of Law at Valparaiso Universit
and a frequent contn·butor to The Cre t. His most recent
article was "Taking Life Seriously: The Case Against Roe
Wad "(February, 1982).
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Howe r I cannot but wond r wheth r moral culpability do in fact r quire purpo or choice. Does
everyon who think John Hinckley hould have been
convicted think he ha been just f igning in anity?
May not ome peopl fe 1 that he d erves to be punished for what he did even if on ome level he couldn't
have cho en to do otherwise? There ar many places
in the law where legal responsibility is not linked to
purpo e or choice. For example, in many jurisdictions
I am committing no crime by carelessly shooting into
the air; but if I hit omeone (even without having realized I was being careless) , then I am liable to be convicted of manslaughter. In both cases my negligence
is surely the same, but when I happen to cause harm we
and the law feel I suddenly deserve much greater
punishment. Desert here correlates to harm and not to
purpose or choice (negligence being held constant in
this example).
The law may even impose limited responsibility on
me for an accident wholly not my fault: if I drive my
car over a child who has run into the street from behind
a bush where he could not have been seen, I am held
responsible for aiding him or summoning aid-because
I have accidentally "created the peril" in which he has
been placed. Again, just speaking for ourselves, do we
really feel exonerated from guilt for the harms we
cause, merely because we may not have been purposely
or by choice vicious? Wouldn't one feel a bit more
guilty of the wholly accidental injury of the child above
if one were the driver rather than a pa senger in the
car? I think so. Would one really feel unjustly treated
if ay one's driver' licen e were automatically u pended for six months whenever one in fact caused
eriou injury with an automobile without regard to
negligence? I think not.
Ordinary moral perception di cem ome degree of
moral guilt for all e il we in fact do de pite our po ible lack of purpo eful choice. Th refore I am not
The Cresset

The problem with psychiatrists is that they operate on deterministic assumptions-so that
the idea of a rational free will becomes for them either false or irrelevant to their science.

in ·an kill r (or would-b kill rs)
puni h an n w wi hed. In ane
ar
cl do in fact de erve some
nd mnation and th refore puni hing
pr
d nt r puni hing wholly inno-

n t
c nt p r n .
How
r, th probl m h re i that our religious
and m ral traditi n do not pro ide u with a theoretical ju ·tifi ation f r uch tri t moral liability." We
feel r pon ibl for th evil w cause without our choice,
but w ant ju tif thi · f lin . Thi theoretical vacuum
would ur 1 b fill d by tho e eager to find a precedent for the amoral u e of tate power. Consequently,
in order to pr dud tyranny we mu t retain the insanity defen e. In thi I agree with Professor Berner.
However, I cannot go along with Professor Berner's
own proposed ver ion of th defense which is "A person
is 'in ane if as a result of mental di ease or defect, he
cannot b justly held re ponsible for his conduct."
While I agree that we should not let psychiatrists determine the ultimate issue of insanity, I disagree that
the i sue of insanity should be wholly one of moral
rather than factual judgment, as Professor Berner's
version makes it.
The law in general expresses not individual but
collective moral values and does so by etting up tests
which indicate which facts should lead to punishment.
While there are grey areas in which we purposely leave
value questions for the jury, we do not, for example,
make the te t for murder simply whether or not the
jury thinks the defendant "showed improper respect
for life."
Similarly, the verdict of "not guilty by reason of
insanity" has been traditionally based on what was
thought to be a factual judgment-namely, whether
or not the defendant possessed reason (it being presumed that everyone has a free will) or else p~ssessed
a will both reasonable and free (free will being no
longer irrebuttably presumed).
The problem with psychiatrists, as Professor Berner
mentions in passing, is that they operate on deterministic assumptions-so that the idea of a rational free will
becomes for them either false or irrelevant to their
science. (We might ay that asking if the defendant'
action was due to his free choice is for them like a king
if it wa due to hi guardian angel.) Moreover, uch
kepticism about the metaphysical ba e for moral
judgment i not confined to the b havioral cience
but is ndemic in modern ociety.
a re ult, the idea
of a factual judgment applying traditional idea of
in anit come to b een a ab urd (like trying to
an wer the guardian angel qu tion factually). In anit
i taken to b am re nominali t lab 1 which jurie attach
an iVh r th ir alu lead th m to wi h for a quittalOctober. 1 1

and this is precisely Professor Berner's own approach
when he says that the "only unmistakable symptom of
insanity is acquittal." His proposal to strike all factual
content from the definition of insanity is an attempt
to finesse an issue which modern society does not have
the capacity to prove or even to justify on a theoretical level.
But then why keep the insanity defense at all? If we
do not really believe any more in the sharp difference
between those with reason and free will and those
without, or if there is no non-arbitrary way to prove
into which category to put a defendant, then why do we
care who gets convicted and who acquitted? All are
equally insane and all are equally guilty, if the e labels
have no factual content.
I submit that we care because we want to pretend that
God is not dead in modern society that contemporary
skepticism is not destructive of every possible ju tification for our moral and legal judgment . We want the
ancient masks of good and evil to continue their play
about us while we also accept that the actor hav long
since died.
Why else does Profe sor Berner begin hi e ay by
aying that the function of the criminal law i to chann 1
society's retributive "impulse"? If retribution i a matter
of impulse rather than of ju tic , then it i sur ly a
monster to be kill d rather than m r ly confin d.
Would we institutionalize pogroms or lynching in
order to channel a society's cru 1 or raci t impul e ?
If someone does not truly deseroe retribution, it i cooperation with sadi m to mak him uff r to ratify
society's impul es. Here again, Profe or B m r want
to adopt modem sk ptici m (whi h tr at r tribution
as a mere impul ) while r taining traditi nal in titutions which dep nd on a far diff r nt world-vi w.
But this cannot without pr t n
r lf-d c pti n b
done. It i either/or: p ychiatry or rational fr
will,
mere impul e or retributive ju ti
m d mit or human dignity.
I think that th tak

in

ma
ur la, . If u h a
ibl , th n th

••
••
19

◄

Theatre
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000

••••••••••
••••••••••
•
••••••••••

Paper Dolls

Good Farce Requires
A Delicate Touch
John Steven Paul
There were a number of notable
productions of French farces around
the country this summer, some by
major companies. Both Moliere's
Don Juan and The Learned Ladies
had new productions in New York
and the American Repertory Theatre brought its Sganarelle: an evening
of M ol£ere farces to the Goodman
Theatre in Chicago. The Guthrie
Theatre in Minneapolis produced
Beaumarchais' The Marriage of Figaro and the Summer Court Theatre
at the University of Chicago gave us
Eugene Labiche's An Italian Straw
Hat.
Before commenting on two of
these productions I must make a
confession. I don't like farce. I'm not
precisely sure what it is about farce
I don't like, but of the productions I
have seen I have been satisfied by
very few. Perhap I'm uncomfortable
with the idea at the core of farce, the
view that human life and experience
are matters merely of meaningle s
motion and that human interaction
is a tissue of manners and convention vulnerable to and worthy of

John teven Paul The Cre ts regular Theatre critic, is a stage director
and teacher of dramatic literature at
Valparaiso University.
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Theatrical farce must be carried off with a high
level of skill· in farce, the production is all.
m n and th
on "ho lab r und r th
w1

ennoble human exp ri nee b lab ling it a trag d ,' we undul tri ialize it by labeling it a far e. '
Dramatic farce i highly vulnerable to mi guided director and unbridled actor . There i u uall le
literary merit in farce than in other
forms of drama. We can rarel b
atisfied to "hear the play,' which i
a phrase often used after a o- o
production of Shakespeare. In the
case of farce, all the theatrical resources must be employed with a
high level of skill; the production i
all. As someone else has said, "the
medium is the message."
The Summer Court Theatre has
offered a high comedy or farce as a
part of its season for the past few
summers. There was a very good
Servant of Two Masters at the Court
two years ago and a very poor Fashion last summer. An Italian Straw Hat,
written in 1860, elaborates on the
classic theme of dramatic farce, marriage and marriageability, and obeys
Murphy's Law of the Drama. Everything that can go wrong, will go
wrong. Fadinard is a bridegroomimminent whose horse has munched
the lady Anais' hat right off the top
of her head. From this equine effrontery proceeds the action of Labiche's farce. Anais, it seems, lost her
hat while illicitly trysting with an
exceedingly virile-looking military
officer. Fearing the potential damage to her reputation, Anais and her
oldier come to Fadinard, on the
morn of his wedding, insisting that
he re tore to her an identical hat. At
the same time the bride's father
barge into the apartment aching for
a reason to call the wedding off. Behind the father is a crowd of family
and friend impatient for th festivitie to begin. But nais and the
oldi r allow Fadinard no alterna-

adinard' fir t t p i a millin r'
hop. hil th in-law hunt around
for th jud
Fadinard uff r the
fury of a woman corn d (the millin r i hi former lov r). t length,
he t 11 Fadinard that th only
Italian traw hat in Pari belongs to
the Barone de Champigny. Off
then to the hou of th Baroness
wh re th noblewoman and her entourage mistake Fadinard for a celebrated musician for whom they have
arranged a chamber recital. When
he learns that Madame has given the
hat as a gift to her niece, Fadinard
ings a little ditty to the assembled
guests and then escapes amidst the
confusion created by the arriving
provincials. At the niece's house,
Fadinard runs afoul of the woman 's
jealous husband whose wife, it turns
out, is none other than the original
victim of the horse. Upon seeing a
fragment of his wife's hat in Fadinard's possession, the husband demands that the entire company return to the original apartments
where he will confront his wife with
the evidence of her faithlessness.
The assembled depart and reassemble at Fadinard's. The bridegroom now realizes that it is Anais
whom both he and the jealous husband have been pursuing and that
his tribulations have come full circle. Just in time, however, one of the
bride's uncle , who is deaf as a post,
announces that his trous eau gift to
the bride i a very expen ive straw
hat imported from Verona! After a
further mischance or two, Fadinard
give the hat to nais and all i well
again. tit point of origin the complication ha been di ol ed: a lad '
honor pre erved a hrewi h hu band ham d a fu ing father plaThe Cresset

The actio~ of An Italian Str~w Hat does not progress, it circles. The circular plot
charactenzes much of classical farce with its gibes at the idea of perfectibility.
cat d aw dding a d, and a hor '
indi r ti n m nd d.
Th a tion f An Italian traw Hat
doe not pro r , it cir l . The
circular plot hara t riz much of
clas i al omedy and far
and per
se gib at th notion of human progress and p rfectibility. From a kind
of divinely el vated drawing board,
the farceur glibly portray homo
ineptus going around in circle .
The problem in many productions of dramatic fare is that homo
is suffocated by ineptus. The Court
Theatre' production provides a
good example of this imbalance.
The competent actors played their
parts with such affectation as to
make them almost inhuman; the
incompetent with such exaggeration
as to make them almost unbearable.
The sets reinforced this twodimensional playing. On a rosy pink
background, the designer had
painted details of streets and apartments in fine black line, giving the
scenic composition the flat look of a
pen and ink drawing. The several
horse-drawn carriages transporting
the wedding guests were painted
boards borne from behind by the
actors as they walked across the
stage. An interesting scenic solution
this, but one which further flattened
the two-dimensional appearance of
the production. The programs carried through the production style
(or flaw) as well. Upon opening up
and reversing the quarto-folded
paper on which the program was
printed, the audience found paperdoll mementoes of Fadinard and
other characters, of the set, and of
the furnishings "for you to color
and cut." Ironically appropriate
remembrances of this production
which was more concerned with
paper dolls than human beings.
The artificiality of the acting and
the ets extended to the stage movement. While one ha come to expect
a certain amount of patterned or
choreographed mo ement in production of French farce, too much
October. 19 1

motion for its own sake, imposed
upon actors by a director, quickly
b comes tedious. No number of
graceful circles, S-curves, or figureeights can take the place of movement emanating from an actor
thinking about his character. There
appeared to be little actor-initiated
movement in An Italian Straw Hat.
One is left to suppose that the director began with an idea of what
French farce is meant to look like on
stage and then imposed that idea
upon his designers and actors. There
are times when this method works,
if the director is very good and there
are no gaps in his staging or in the
actors' ability to remember it. But
there often are gaps, and actors who
have not been led by the director to
be inventive and imaginative are
hard-pressed to fill them.
The actors in the American Repertory Theatre production of Sganarelle: an evening of Moliere farces were
nothing if not imaginative and inventive. The company under the
direction of the highly-acclaimed
Andrei Serban collected four short
farces, each with a Sganarelle character and each on the theme, again,
of marriage and marrying. In the
first of the four, we detect Moliere
the actor drawing his material for
an early play from a source he mu t
have known very well, the Commedia dell'Arte. Here are all th
familiar characters of the Italian
comedy: the young lovers, the di approving father, and the mi hi vous servant Sganarelle, a de cendant of Harlequin, Punchinello , and
Scapino all in a piece call d The
Flying Doctor.
The plot i extreme! impl and
de igned as a framework for a t urde-force by the actor playing ganarelle. A father want hi daught r
to marry a rich man in t ad f th
man sh love . Th tru lov and th
girl' cou in hatch a h m t f I
the old man: th will di gui
lov r' ervant ganar II a · a d t r
who will t 11 th fath r that hi

daughter is too sick to be married.
The disguised Sganarelle readily
convinces the old man of the daughter's illness, but when he crosses the
old man's path a hort while later
without his doctor's gown, the scamp
is forced into another charade. In
order to maintain the ruse, Sganarelle pretends that he, sans doctor's
gown, is the doctor's identical twin
brother. The old man insists on
bringing the two together at hi
house. Sganarelle does a quickchange routine to keep the credulous ·old codger beli ving that he i
two people in tead of on .
The quick-change routine i the
centerpiece of this littl play. A
Sganarelle, Thoma D rrah p rformed acrobatic feat app aring in
one moment as the "doctor" and in
another as the 'broth r." Wh n the
old man became u piciou at not
eeing the two togeth r , ganar lle
heel half hi do tor' gown and,
appearing at an up tair window,
display d on id of him lf from
one side of th wind w, and th
oth r ide of him elf from th
th r
"two
brother

}or, d 1ar-
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Too often, attempts at style in acting, staging, and design burn the bridge
between drama and audience and leave us without access to the action on stage.
about hi future a a lawfull ,_
w dded hu band. Thi i a middl aged ganarell
one , ho think
about hi action . d ic from a
friend a philo opher and a
p y
fortune-tell r, a w 11 a an ov rheard con r ation between hi
fiancee and her lo er our him on
the idea of marriag . When ganarelle goe to the woman' father to
decline the honor of hi daughter'
hand, the father inform Sganarelle
that he ha no choice. They will be
married under threat of violence.
Sganarelle orrowfully agrees and
the forced marriage takes place. As
the couple departed the wedding
scene, the guest viciou ly pelted
them with rice. Sganarelle had married into neither a very happy nor
a very healthy society.
Moliere composed the third play,
The Imag,:nary Cuckold, in ver e
(translated, as were all the texts, by
Alfred Bermel). The language of the
play demanded relatively formal
production of the story of a husband,
Sganarelle, who, through a series of
misapprehensions and misinterpretations, comes to believe that his wife
is being unfaithful to him. As in An
Italian Straw Hat, the actors in The
Imagi:nary Cuckold are forced to work
within a pre-established formal
structure, imposed upon them, in
this case, not by the director but by
the playwright. The sense of liberation that buoyed the first two plays
was, consequently, missing from the
third. The actors' inventiveness,
burdened by the verse, seemed
labored. Acting exercises and rehearsal objects that were probably
used as launching pad for imaginative flights retained their tatus as
exerci e and object inorganically
conn cted to the play. And the audience seemed less comfortable with
thi tyli tic idiom, the farthe t removed from their exp rience.
If the director and th actor conformed themselve to the lingui tic
trictur of The Imag£nary Cuckold
they di carded Molier /Bermel'
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lan 1a
f r th f urth pt '·
Dunib how (that titl w rk
n
numb r f 1 I ) ,
a lapt cl fr m
A Doctor In pi:te of Him If In thi
pla th marria
and marryin
card ar
hum d a ain and ut
com a fath r , h want hi daughter to marry on man· h d ir
another. \ hen in reaction to h r
fath r' in i tenc
the girl fall
dumb the father end hi ervant
to find a do tor. The rvant com
upon the , ife of non other than
Sganarell a woodcutter. Th , if
tells the ervant that her hu band
i a doctor, but that they will ha
to cudgel him into admitting it.
They cudgel him and he admit that
he, Sganarelle, i a doctor. The
servant bring Sganarelle back to
the father and the daughter wher
Sganarelle the woodcutter babble a
lot of Latinate double-talk to convince the old man that he is a doctor.
When the woodcutter learns the
real reason for the girl's ailment
from her true love, he connive to
bring them together and thus cures
her dumbness.
The actors reduced the script to
its essential physical action, a series
of human interactions uncolored by
the intellectual subtleties of language. The production is vintage

t mpt t

naindi idual
with on
ppar ntly
a a on
ion to int lli ibility, th
d ci ion wa mad to add ub-title .
he e le nd wer printed on
card and held hi h abov the playing ar a and hifted lik cu card
a the play progr
d. They proved
to b di tracting rather than h lpful.
The American Repertory Theatre's arch for a univer al means of
expre sing Moliere's idea · points
the direction for all would-be producers of fare comedy. Too often
attempts at style in acting, staging
and design burn the bridge between
drama and audience and leave us
without access to the action on stage.
All drama depends on the recognition of human beings in action by
other human beings in attendance.
If we are unable to so recognize our
fellows on stage, we might just as
well have paper dolls.
ti
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America may be the only country in the world where
people sit watching other people talk to each other.

Television News
As Inside Dope
The Ritual Meanings
Of Washington Gossip
James Combs
America, ome wag h as suggested,
is the only country in the world
where people sit around ilently
and watch other people talk to each
other. The people we watch talking
to each other, of cour e, are the people on TV. The recently-dead Dave
Carroway was one of the great pioneers of the medium because he
demonstrated that mass audiences
find people talking to each other on
TV interesting and enjoyable to
watch. And ever more so we watch
talk-interviews, the chitchat of
newspersons, the talk show, and so
on, talk without end, amen. ESPN,
the cable sports channel, even has a
collection of sportswriters who solemnly gather periodically to remasticate the momentous events in
the PGA golf tour or whatnot. And
of cour e the Christian shows use
talk format regularly, as fans of Jim
Bakker or Pat Robertson will attest.
It is interesting to note that a good
bit of this talk is rehearsed. The
Tonight Show, for example, has from
the day of Jack Paar on followed a
fairly tight script, with the guest
primed ahead of time on what to
ay. The purpose i to keep the how

Jame Comb teaches Political c£ence
at Valparaiso niversity and is The
Cre et s regular Television en.tic.
October, 19 '2

moving, off of subjects that might
turn off the audience, and to give the
impre ion of gaiety and conviviality. Producers of the e shows use
uch terms as "planned spontaneity"
and "contrived candor" to describe
what they are up to. In the world of
the talk how, spontaneity cannot
b left spontaneous, nor can candor
be candid. Johnny Carson's great
gift as host of the show is to convey
a ense of casual fun among relaxed
celebritie . Carson's Tonight Show
is now a TV ritual, a kind of American No theater, wherein all the audience is familiar with the plot, and
responds by being amused by the
rituals, indeed being amused by
their own ritual responses. The producer of such a show has the job of
trying to make the guesttalk part of
the overall ritual.

Why do we watch news
talk shows? Surely it
isn't because they are so
intrinsically interesting.
The audience watches the talk.
Why do we watch it? Surely it isn 't
because it is so intrinsically interesting. The slightest reflection of
what goes on in talk shows hould
convince us all that it is pretty silly.
But in a mass-mediated oci ty, we
have somehow learned the idea that
what celebrities on the Tube ay to
each other is more important, insightful, or funny than what w ay
to each other. It was often aid in the
early days of TV that the new medium would de troy "the art of conversation." It is likely that th art of
conversation has been dead
Samuel John on, and that mo t m dern dinner-table conver ation
would be dreary, opinionat d , and
certainly not artful wh th r
exi ted or not. Tho p opl wh
leave the dinner tabl plat in hand
to watch football or, ye , talk h
are quit right: th
ritual i m r
fun than the dullard , u ju t l ft.
t 1 a t om work i put int th

talk show to give it a little art, even
if it is only pop art.
For this and many other reasons,
it ha come to pass that people find
TV talk more agreeable than their
own talk. At least, we think, those
people know how to talk. In any
event, people sit (or do housework)
and consume the variou conver ations broadcast over TV. Indeed,
they come to identify with the participants and even "engage" in th
conversation going on.
Professor John Caughey of the
University of Maryland ha writt n
about "artificial ocial r lation " and
"media mentors." He maintain that
the artificial ocial world of the
average American include p udorelation with eel briti s on TV often hundred of th m - that w
can id ntify, lov and hat , talk to
and tru t f el that w kn w. P opl
-e p cially wh n they ar al n will participat by int rj tin
ment into the onv r ati n on
A man from Mar might think u h
conv r ation b tw n a Ion individual at h m and on r ing
lebriti thou and of mil awa in
a TV
, but ap-
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On Washington Week in Review, the participants spend a lot of time predicting
what is going to happen, but their predictions often turn out to be quite wrong.
vi "er. Th T
hared b the
talker con titute a group and
group will oft n dream up om
pretty amazing thin that the b lieve to be true. o ial p cholo i t
u e term like " hared fanta y' and
'groupthink" to characterize the
rich imagery that group come to
share if the members cohere. It i
astounding what group member
will allow them elves to believe if
they feel part of a cohe ive, upportive group in which all the other
member confidently believe X to be
the case. The famous "when prophecy fail "study indicates that people
will believe all the more ardently
in the face of disconfirming facts if
they receive group support in the
belief. If the TV talkers cohere, the
lone viewer may accept what they
are saying as true, and continue to
believe it even in the face of contrary facts if he can return to the
same show for more support.
The reason your columnist speculates on this is some recent work I
did looking at one particular talk
show set up in a clear group format:
Washington Week in Review, a weekly
discus ion among important journalists broadcast over PBS. I looked
at the show in a period covering the
first 100 Days of the Reagan Administration, January 23-May 1, 1981.
The purpose was to study what the
group came to think was going on
out there in the political and economic world, and what kind of
shared fantasy the viewer at home
might come to share by watching the
talk. (This was part of a larger study
-which I will now shameless! y
plug-a book entitled Mediated Political Realities, to be published by
Longman, Inc., later this year.)
Washington Week in Review ( WWR)
involves a small group of elite journalist who gather weekly to a se
what i going on in th world of
politic and economics. The moderator, Paul Duke is always there,
and ome journali t are there o
often a to be virtual regular (Hed-
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rick mith f th
f r ampl ). It i
nt but it i

thirty-minute time pan. It i
also low key and highly cohe ive·
there are no heated debate or id ological divi ion (unlike Agronsky
and Company a show built on clear
ideological difference , or the Braden-Buchanan liberal/ conservative
matchup on Ted Turner's C
cable news). Everyone is nice and tame
and non-threatening; judging by
WWR, reporters are just not obnoxious anymore. WWR is highly ritualized, with much rhetorical agreement and a high sense of group
identity. The members of the group
appear silently aware of their elite
status, and they try very hard to be
responsible and sincere and to avoid
cynical remarks. If there is contempt
for Reagan among these reporters,
it was impossible to discern in the
programs observed over the period
of the study.

There are no heated
debates or ideological
divisions on Washington
Week. Everyone is nice
and tame and agreeable.
Indeed, the reporters' treatment
of the President was quite the oppoite. He was characterized respectfully a "the Great Communicator,"
who "brims with confidence" and is
'riveting' on TV. When he wa hot,
he became the gallant leader who
"lifted the nation
pirits." In the
ho pital, he became a eventy-year
old " uperpatient ' , ho had ' r markabl recov r power ." He al o

rt r '

ongress
K mp-Roth.)
pa
hi h brin m to an intriguing
a p ct of WWR: the report r engage in much prediction a to what
i going to happ n but without
much ucces . One of the striking
things about looking back months
later at what they pr dieted i how
much of it turned out to be wrong.
But the group consensus about its
own elite qualifications seems to be
too strong to let self-doubt enter in.
Certainly the next w ek, or weeks
afterward, the participants don 't
reflect back on their failed predictions. As group studies have often
indicated, the function of intragroup
communication is not the discovery
of truth but the discovery of cohesion.
But perhaps the most interesting
aspect of WWR is the approach the
reporters take to their storytelling
within the group. As elite members
of the national press corps, with
access to the corridors of power, they
are supposed to know what is going
on. But what do they convey of what
is going on? Are events placed in the
context of the larger historical tides
of our time? Is there discussion of
the economic and political processes
at work in the world? No. News,
after all, is immediate and topical,
and so are newsmen, no matter how
honored. The political reality of
WWR is gossip. What the reporters
talk about i the immediate drama
of what' happening a the ha e
di covered it from their acce to
official Wa hington- enior official ' and th like. Familiarity with
uch tale prove that the are inThe Cresset

Television is a powerful communications medium
but communication is not necessarily knowledge.'
deed lit n w p opl and that they
do in fact kn w what i going on.
The gr up a ur
it elf th reby
that the member belong there. The
viewer can enter into the shared
world of the group, and as ure himself that he too know what is going
on and indeed what is going to happen.
In the famous study The Lonely
Crowd, David Riesman and associates argued in 1950 that the American character was changing. The
cement of the society was no longer
traditional values, which people no
longer took seriously or found viable. Nor were we motivated by a
moral code that provided a gyroscope for behavior and that made us
feel guilty when we didn't live up
to it. Rather now, Riesman said, we
are "other-directed," motivated by
anxiety, and thus anxious about
what others think of us. So the basis
of society becomes the tendency of
people to conform to the expectations and preferences of groups. In
a society without tradition or a widespread moral code, the premium is
put on knowing what other people
are doing and adjusting to that.
Thus reality becomes street knowledge-immediate, factual information of who is doing what. We reduce anxiety through such knowledge, what Riesman called "inside
dope."

If WWR is "mandatory
viewing for official
Washington ," Fridays are
awfully dull in D.C.
When peer groups get together
and talk, then, what is shared is the
fantasy that we know what's really
going on. The group goal becomes
one of seeking consensus on who we
are and what we do , reducing whatever anxieties we might have about
our status and knowledge. WWR is
an ecology of inside dope. The reporter ' definition of political reality
is gossipy and immediate because
October, 1982

that is what the group expects. They
are not cynics, but neither are they
taken in; their talent is informational, not ideological; their stance is
professional, not political; the badge
of their status is not breadth of perspective, but inside dope. It may not
be the inside dope of The National
Inquirer or People magazine, but it
remains inside dope all the same.
WWR, then, is simply a variation
on the television phenomenon of the
talk show. Viewers of the show can
come away from it with the illusion
that they too now know what is going
on, or at least that they have momentarily entered into the reality of a
group that does. It is said that WWR
is "mandatory viewing for much of
official Washington" (things must
be pretty dull if official Washington
has nothing better to do on a Friday
night). If it is, then perhaps WWR
exercises influence on how elite politicians themselves think about
politics, since elites as well as masses
can be drawn into sharing the fantasies of groups with which they
identify. Which is a so berin g
thought when one remembers how
often WWR turns out to be wrong
in its assured predictions as to what
is going to happen in the political
world.
Television is perhaps the mo t
powerful communications medium
ever devised, but communication
is not necessarily the same thing as
knowledge. WWR obeys the canon
of the communication medium in
terms of the news talk show format ,
and indeed WWR has been much
copied in local and regional PB
and commercial station . We could
here get into larger journalistic and
even epistemological issu s about
truth, knowledge, and information
but that is beyond our op and
competence. Let u conclud b
simply posing th old que tion I
realitya real a it look · ? ftr
studying WWR and refl cting on it ·
implications, my re pon ha to b
Platonic: probably not.
::
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War of the Words
Charles Vandersee
Dear Editor,
Like everyone else, I read some
novels last summer. I remember
strange parts of them , such as a
character named Ashton Nichols ,
in Son of the Morning, by Joye Carol
Oates.
ichol is an upstate N w
York boy who doe not Iike to read.
"It seemed to him that if people
had anything important to say they
would say it out loud and ev ntually
it would get around; what wa th
need to keep thing tiny and · r t,
writing them down?"
Then in The Affair, by C. P. ' now,
p ople take th oppo ·it view. h s
arc fellow of on of th
am briclg
colleg s, who conv n to cl al with
one of their own men, a · i nti ·t
charged with fraud. Their on r-

harl
and rse returns, after loo
long an absence, as a regular contn·butor to Th
r -~ t. A nativ of the
Midwest and a gr~duale of Valparaiso
niver. ity, he earned hi Ph.D. at
[ CLA. ince the mid-1.960 , he has
taught Amen·can Literalur and Poetrv
at the lniversitv of Virginia . He i an
expert on 1 / enry Adam and is an
editor of his Lett r., the fir. I thr
t•olumes of u•hich will be publi hed
later thi year by the Ilan 1ard llniversitv Pres.

God speaks a little slower in the South; that difference in tempo and a zany
interpretation about the children of Ham, may once have contributed to a war.
ation and th ir delib ration coni t of indirection, artful a oidan
of plain tatem nt and polit 1
dangerou formulation : full of
implication but de ignedly free of
firm accu ation or bald opinion.
At the nd of th no el the pend
a full day compo ing a tatement
of their conclu ion which in uhstance and tone ha to ati f all of
th contentiou indi idual .
ow, in autumn well into the
new seme ter, it occurs to me (as
it often does in teaching) that my
purpose is one and one only: to illustrate to student the large number
of different way human beings
expect language to work. In teaching
poetry, for example, I like to start
with a lawyer. Wallace Stevens was
a claims investigator and eventually
a vice president of the Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Company.
He composed poem a he walked
to the office. In reputation he equals
the greats of his generation (Eliot,
Pound, Frost), and he deranges
students with lines like these:
In that ovember off Tehuantepec
The slopping of the sea grew still one night.
t breakfast jelly yellow streaked the deck
And made one think of chop-house chocolate
And ham umbrellas . nd a ham-like green
Capped summer-seeming on the tense machine
Of ocean ..

After they have struggled, fascinated,
with everal of hi poems, slogging
from one interpretive morass to
another, I briefly quote from his
letters. Steven started writing at
the turn of the century, when (like
Pound, Eliot, and Frost) he felt,
ju tifiably that poetry in the Engli h language was effete banal,
unk in overfamiliar con ention,
and needing revival. He undertook
thi in his own way: "Per onally,
I like \ ord to ound wrong.'
othing he might have aid can
gain a student' attention so effectively. He might have aid he
wrote crazy ver e to duce tupid
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maid n , r that all hi " ritin
od
r that h

"•a
wa

on can u langua
atel wron 'wa in ord r t
from a reader the b t of re p n
tall green att ntion.
Teachin in the outh at a pla
where on undergraduate in thr
come from out id the tat
anticipate that student bring different
xpectation to languag .
There may be regional exp ctation .
'Among the ew Englander' man
weakne e " said the Boston hi torian Henry Adams 'i one which
gives him what character he ha · it
is, love of, or rather fear of the
truth." Therefore when as e ing
Southern tatesmen, ew Englander "bowed to Wa hington and d spised Jefferson." Supple, easy
agreeable in his letters and his
talk, Jefferson appeared to the
Adamses too flexible, "a moral
coward. Justly or unjustly they
thought he did not tell the truth."
Thinking of the Virginians in my
classes, at the University founded
by "Mr. Jefferson," disposes me to
a certain leisure. I avoid dogmatism, for at least the first week or
two, and remain open to wide
varieties of interpretation of a
text-even the zany.

Language is a war; a war
waged against silence. I
teach the ways of war.
Yet there are also students like
Glenn, last year, from Long Island.
When I proceed with prolonged
tolerance and equivocation, I have
to remember him. Taciturn in class
or else blunt with questions and
ter e with answer he wants something el e. There are people in thi
world (Adams aw them in his ance try) who are d termined to eize
truth. Impatient the want the

truth dir

tl rh
{a
brut 1, ru l
b t-th

ame
t rm to
rad -to h ar the

minut " he
m t."
Long
I land ermon i t n minut . Here
in Do vood Vir inia, the ervice
runs well b ond th hour even
"ithout Communion. God speaks
a littl
low r in the South; that
difference in tempo, and a zany
interpretation about the children
of Ham, may once have contributed
to a war.
Language, of cour e is itself
war-a war waged against silence,
a the poet Vassar Miller put it.
So as a teacher I teach the ways of
war. Henry Adams and his fathers
expected language to work like the
Quincy granite they grew up near:
a durable and permanent substance
to build a fortress of candor and
hard truth. Jefferson and some of
his Virginia brethern were more
pacific, expected language to work
as smooth social graphite. Wallace
Stevens and his fellow modernists
expected language to work as a
sharp summons to attention, a pikestaff planted along the road with
a plaque carrying the name of a
place the reader-traveler has never
heard of. Hemingway, writing in
the golden age of Frost, Stevens,
Eliot, and Pound, and writing of
the Great War, aid that abstract
words like courage, honor, and sacrifice were repulsive. They were at
war with reality. The only honest
words were short concrete worcls:
names of towns and river , numbers
of regiment and dates. Hemingway expected language to work
imply, unambiguou 1 a it had on
naming day in Eden. To use the
language of glory when peaking
The Cresset

The differe~t ways ~n whi~,h we ~ar,,on silence reveal who we are as much as they
get across mformat1on or meanmg that we think we possess about the world.
a ab urd. . P. now
how
r, th t th languag
machin
dam and
dam tark unerrin uld b am ng
individual wh ar for d to live
tog th r und r tr
a deadly
ling h t n din onl ne ton to
wreak d truction.
Still, i n't
hton
ichol the
one who' mainly right? Don t we
mainly u e langua
to get important thing aero
directly? Even
if tho e important thing are 'only"
our urgent feeling of the moment?
Isn't language a bridge mainly,
rather than an ob curing cloud a
weapon, a top sign?
I am not fully convinced. aul
Bellow in an interview once stated
what seems to me one of the more
profound of human truths. It went
something like this: "If you ask me
any civilized question, I will tell
you the answer, because I know what
the answer is. But if you ask me
what I really feel in my heart, that's
something else again." The something else is not so much the inexpressible truth as it is the prudently
unexpressed. When I read an ad I
know that somebody wants me to
buy. I do not know what the maker
really thinks-whether Helena
Rubenstein really thinks that her
products contribute as much to a
woman's wellbeing as reading a
book might. I don't know what the
scientist captive in her lab and in
his own life thinks about his days
and years in relation to this season's
super new emollient. I go along with
Bellow and others, who suspect
language is often saying a great
deal alongside of what it ostensibly says.
I remember a colleague a few
years ago expressing amazement
after reading Jean-Paul
artre's
memoir, The Words. What wa so
amazing? The moral earne tness
of this fecund polemici t? The
acrificial labor of a man who
poured out tract , novel treati e ,
es ays, in an effort to recon titute
October. 1982

uropean thought after World War
II? one of this. Sartre confessed
that a a child he wrote because he
loved to write, and by the time he
was grown up, writing had become
a habit. He examined himself and
faced the truth. Not so much morality or ideology drove him as did
heer inner necessity. "My commandments were sewn into my
kin; if I go a day without writing,
the car burns me." It appeared
quite secondary that he had anything to say.

Before we search for
meaning, we need human
and divine understanding.
The chairman of Sony Corporation, Akio Morita, describes Japanese conversations: "In Japan ,
it is not considered polite to state
your intention right at the beginning. Americans get very confu ed
over the Japanese use of yes and no.
It is not very polite to say no. But
yes does not always mean yes.
Usually, if they mean no, they will
say, 'I will consider it."' World war
as well as civil war, wherever one
happens to be listening.
All these territories ought to be
pretty much familiar. Culture
differ in their degree of candor.
Human beings clothe them elve
in language to conceal the rough
skin of their barbarou notion ,
their eagerness for advantage
their unsanctioned intimation that
nothing really matter as much a
people say. Language i a ritual
a mask, a game, and alway a n e ity. But here' the wond r: p opl
behave in English cla
a if non
of thi went on-a if childr n n

Frost even: "Why don't they just
say what they mean?" When a poem
for once does this, it becomes an
abiding treasure· my insurance
man has told me his favorite:
"Gunga Din."
So I remind myse!f-and sometimes the class-that we need not
(indeed, dare not) devot all our
energie to a search for meaning.
Meaning, that is, in the ense of
exactly what it wa that our writ r
wa "trying to get aero ." Before
we search for meaning, and om times instead of earching for
meaning, we ne d human and divine understanding: that an Emily
Dickin on, for example, has lo
write peculiarly elliptical p m ,
that a Lyndon John on has lo inv t
politics with th down-horn
randiloquence of the We t, that g d
have to er ate and b rat that
Iwith

irritat .
W ar all dri v n d wn th van u
ho n
path of languag that ha
u , and th cliff r nt wa · that w

or

to

m

ning.'
Fr m D

icln ..
Ii ·nipt
r -

cl .

me, of Dickin on ,
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Fit for What?
Second Thoughts on
The Cult of Health
Gail Eifrig
If we want to see just how potent
the ideal of fitness has become in our
culture, we can look, if we can stand
it, at the image of Baby Doe. Last
spring, in Indiana, this Downs' syndrome baby was born with severe
but operable deformity of the digestive system. After numerous legal
ploys and gambits, the parents were
allowed to choose that the baby
should be left untreated, and after
six days, it died. The legalities of the
case have not yet been settled finally,
and ethicists assure us that the case
has provided them with material to
debate for months to come. But
while fine points of the argument
may generate some interesting problems for the mind, surely the involuntary shudder is an unmistakable
guide to the rightness or wrongness

A !though this marks her first venture as
a Nation columnist Gail Eifrig is no
stranger to the pages of The Cres et in
which her articles have appeared frequent! , and for which she once served a
term as Book Review Editor. A graduate
of Valparaiso University, where she now
teaches English she recently received
her Ph.D. from Bryn Mawr.
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in m
tion
r
up hearin th
azi r vil d
particular! for th ir code and
tern of fitne both produ ing tho
who were and ext rminatin tho
who weren't. To manipulat th
genetic pool wa en rall out id
the azi e tabli hment, f lt to b
wrong, and to go o far a to eliminate tho e already alive who were not
up to some phy ical tandard wa
universally condemned. Many people felt they were fighting the war
not because of territorial inva ion
but because of the brutal attack that
the azis had made on moral tandards. As surely as their tank roared
into Czechoslovakia, their geneticists and the propagandists who
worked with them broke through the
boundaries of what had been considered the acceptable limits of
power for the state and its medical
assistants.
But everything changes, and fit-

pernta
b en
pr rv cl.
It mi ht b upp
d that of all
p pl th J w am n u would b
th mo t autiou in adoptin thi
n we t wa of a hi vin
al ation ,
but from an informal tudy conducted on the street of Chi ago I
d due that jogging at least, i hardly re tricted to ryan . Everybody
i , a the current phra e o inelegantly puts it "into fitne s." The
industry mu t be one of the few
bowing upward line on corporate
graph ; from ike to exercycles to
health club memb~rships, money is
the requisite first step to the body
you want to be. Aerobic dancing?
pay for the class, find a sitter, buy a
leotard. Running? fifty dollar shoes,
a natty pair of sweat , and, according
to the study referred to earlier, an
audio system and a purebred German shepherd.
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On Abortion
John Strietelmeier I ..Legalized Homicide "
Richard Stith / Why I Care About Abortion
Calvin Eichhorst / Moral and Theological Issues
In the Abortion Controversy
Donald A . A ffeldt I A Response
David Horowitz and Jean Garton I Abortion:
Should the Constitution
Protect the Right to Choose?
All Six Essays in One Twenty-Four Page Folio
Single Copy, 35¢
Ten Copies, 25¢ Each
Hundred Copies, 2()¢ Each
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moral, political and ocial-of exerci e. The fit body i a pure body,
and pre umabl y, the body that will
vote to ban nuclear en rgy, ave the
whales, and elect a ticket of Tom
Hayd n and Marlo Thoma to national office in 1984. This is the book
that is leading the way to the next
brave new world, where everybody
will exercise together and cooperate
in a whole-grain
irvana where
crime, poverty, and oppres ion will
cease and death will have no more
dominion.
o, it cannot be. Fitness may be
nice, it may even be fun, but it's not
next to godliness. Death still waits
at the end of every life, however
trim the thighs, however unclogged
the arteries. As a way of determining
who are the good people, the right
people, the worthwhile people,
physical fitness is an unreliable criterion. When we begin to judge the
worth of a person's life by his pulse
rate, his muscle-to-fat ratio, cholesterol count, or even the number of
chromosomes in his genetic makeup,
we are on dangerous ground. For
the standards of fitness can change,
and everyone can be judged unfit
by some system, depending on the
judge.
To my mind there is a particularly fruitful irony in the current concern over suntan . In Victorian ociety for example, the suntan was
hunn d as a mark of social inferiority (it meant you had to work outdoor ) and it became a mark of
tatus onl when the working cla e
di pla ed what wa known a a facOctober. 1982

tory pallor. To be tan then meant
that you had leisure to lie about
doing nothing while other people
were huddled indoors over typewriters, or were otherwise in thrall
to an economic system which, among
it many evils, kept them identifiably
pale. "Tan" gradually came to be
ynonymous with "healthy."
Lately, we have developed what
strikes me (and Gerry Trudeau) as
very funny, the concept of "working
on a tan," which I believe to be this
decade's best oxymoron. This summer though, the shadow began to
come across the sun. Suddenly people took notice of the warnings about
suntans which doctors had been telling some patients for years: that
healthy look can kill you. Suntan, it
turns out, is the body's mechanism
for protecting itself from the assault
of the sun. Skin cancer not all of it
as harmless as many people like to
think, ha increased directly with
the rising popularity of the beautiful
tan. What had been a sure sign of
fitness turns out to have been quite
the reverse.
Christians ought probably to be
the most cautious of all in adopting
the values of the secular world about
fitness, for we are compelled to acknowledge our Lord's stubborn partiality for the unfit. The kingdom
of heaven, oddly enough, is for the
children, the lame, the halt, and the
blind. Jesus, it is true, did not b lieve that those state were ideal;
when he could, he did omething
about them, and the lam walked ,
the blind received their ight. But
when we equate phy ical goodn
with moral or piritual goodn
need to be reminded of certain hard
truths. Fitne s i being promot d in
our culture as a commodity, a p ses ion, a treasure, and w ar
tempted to de pise tho e who don 't
hav it, a our culture teach u t
look down on tho e who driv ru t
car . But faith in bodily fitn s , lik
faith in anything 1 e, can b a nar .
II our illu ion ab ut fitn . mu t
run up again t that impla abl
word: it i th meek , th p r th
unfit who will inh rit th onl king<lorn worth ha ing.
••

••

Books
------------------------------...,......----------------------------The Kennedy Imprisonment
A Meditation on Power. By Garry
Wills. Boston: Little, Brown/ Atlantic
Monthly Press. 310 pp. $14.95

James Combs
Thi book i lik a Chines morgasbord: a range of th m s and
topics, ome ta ty and oth r not,
unified by the loo e purpo
of
sati fying th palate imm diat ly
and providing food for thought
afterward . lthough off ring p rhap not the mo t m morabl dinn r,
Garry Will ha whipp d up an iconocla tic and picy far ,
rv d in
gen rou porti n . Forth K nn d
are a di h to which w in itably
r tum in m ri an politi al ui in ,
and we hav c n um cl them rav nou ·ly for th la ·t tw nty-odd
ar ·.
But Will 'trcatrn nt giv · u · a m r
quea y f eling ab ut th m than hav
many arli r ff ring ·.
v ill has a gift for c mbining th
uni r al and parti ular th
n
I
and t pi al, th ' th mati an l th
go. ip .
an find h
ing tidbit ab ut th
x li
, th ir nt urag of hang r ·on , amp-foll w •r ·, and a ad mi
hill th ir un ncling familial mtrigu . But all thi.· i put in th
nf \ hat th famj} ha · m , nt
liti , and \ ill
th
b
•. II

m
a " 1 ri n 'r "-of •. , famil , , imag , hari ma , ncl J >, ·•r anl hi l > k
ran ~• , bit hapha,,ar II ,
•r th •
21

them .
Th K nn d
lik d irl . But
xual p w r, like
mu h I ,
cam back to haunt th m . Will off r no libidinal theory of th p w r
driv , but h do und r tand (in
one of th b t lin
in th book)
that th ' libidinou imp riali m'
they practiced became u pect in
the ' po tcolonial era of xual r lations. ' The became pri oner of
family in part by athering around
them a gag 1 of courti r whom
Wills call "honorar Kenned
ambitiou ye -men who 'help d"
them into the Bay of Pig , the coverup at Chappaquiddick, and the di a trous entry into the 19 0 Pre idential race. The Kennedys created
the " ppearances
Pre idency "
which tried to co-opt pre s and intelligentsia in an attempt to "arrange
reality, to make style become ubtance, to define power as the contriving of appearance ." But by now,
Wills says, the public has seen
through the fraud, and the attempt
by Ted to sustain a rather tarnished
image fails. As Mr. Dooley said,
you can't follow a banjo act with a
banjo act, yet Ted is stuck with
playing the same tune to a more
skeptical audience.

The Kennedys liked
girls. But sexual power
returned to haunt them.
Further, the Kennedys became
prisoners of charisma, the idea that
Presidential power resided in the
charismatic leader who ruled
by "delegitimating" in titutions
through his own personalismo. Since
JFK according to Wills, the Presidency has been prisoner to the
notion that rule has to be conducted
apart from and again t the government. Presidential candidates
characteri ti call y po e as chari matic figures running against the
very government they propose to
head; by delegitimating government, they increa e frustration and
mi tru t. Will make the nice point
that Machiavelli u ed the charismatic figur of Ce are Borgia a a
negative exampl of the ambitiou
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r a h f r p , • r a p rt fr m in i-

and

meri a mu t pr
wdo n that
r i e
of p liti
plomac er ate .
Will ' tr atm nt of th K nn d
(John in particular) tend to the r
lentle 1 pro ecutorial but " hatever the fault of the book, it ha th
con iderabl merit of a ba ic undertandin of the u e and p ril of
power. Chari matic power ha a
tendency to become imperial (or
maybe it is that imperial power ha
a tendency to become chari matic);
John Kennedy and the President
who followed him became pri oner
of hubn·s, the overconfident and
careless application of power that
dissipates it and drains domestic
resources and will. We have sometimes assumed that democratic empire, led by a tough and "realistic"
Presidency, can do anything; but the
"political ironies" that Thucydides
wrote of undoes our pretensions.
The occasionally-disastrous results
of recent Presidential audacity explain the current rehabilitation of
the reputation of Eisenhower; his
caution in the application of power
now makes him seem a very shrewd
ruler. Political fools rush in where
wise princes fear to tread.
The imperial mystique equates
power with the obvious instruments
of control, not the subtle and real
basic of power in opinion and reputation. Political wisdom dictate
the careful use of might in the
presence of the cultivation of right,
giving renewed power to relegitimated institutions a creative legacy
that a prince can pa s on. The power
to de troy i unstable power; the
power to create-to evoke the figure of Machiavelli a ain -is the
power of true tatecraft, politic a
an art. Will analysi ugge t that

Wills' treatment of
John Kennedy tends
to the prosecutorial.
It i n
f th
r k-like ironie
f m ri a that th p liti ally powrful ha
uch ifficult undertandin power. Am rican make
bad Machiav llian : ither we elect
Pre ident who prof
not to like
po r and claim to ri e above it, or
we elect Pre ident -like Kennedywho mi und r tand it proper use.
The result i that we apply power
inappropriately or in an amateurish
fa hion. The correct le son to be
learned from the Kennedy imprisonment i not that we can have a
politics without power, but that we
must exerci e power with a sophisticated awareness of the political
implications of what we are doing.
Only then will we have a chance to
wield power in a pragmatic and,
yes, humane way.
Cl

Meditation on a
Student Meditating
This African woman
lies flat
asleep on the floor.
A copper snake
in the deserther ivory teeth,
Skull on the earth.
Her arms, the cactus
beige in autumn unning.
Her buttock , sage.
Leg twi ted weeds
of the afternoon wind.
Travis Du Priest
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Reflections of an
Old Liberal- I I

John Strietelmeier
In la t June's Harper's, Alan
Brinkley suggested that Theodore
H. White's Ameri"ca i'n Search of
Itself: The Maki'ng of the Presi'dent,
1956-1980 could be read as a kind of
elegy for what White calls the "Old
Country"-the America of the 1950s,
the America of the moderate-toliberal ascendancy. And Brinkley
further suggested that, "for liberals of the World War II generation,
it was inevitable that it should end
this way: in sour recriminations
against a society that seems to have
rejected their values."
I have identified myself as a
liberal since about 1932. My professional career spans the quartercentury during which liberalism
pretty much dominated the scene.
My preoccupations during that
time were with those areas of inquiry in which faith questions the
secular order. Institutionally, I
was deeply involved in the life of
The Lutheran Church-Missouri
Synod (until 1965) and, as a geographer-journalist, in the politics
of change from 1947 to 1973.
ext month I will have something
to ay about the contribution of
liberalism to our national life.
Thi month I would like to id ntify,
a honestly and dispas ionately as
I can, what I believe it ha contribut d to that small egment of
the Church which I wa once privileged to
erve-The Lutheran
Church-Mi ouri nod.
October, 1982

"Lib ral" ha always, and for
und r tandable rea on , been a
dirty word in the Mis ouri Synod.
Much of what passed as religious
lib rali m in the past eighty years
or o wa little more than good old
Yankee boo terism gussied up with
Je u talk-not to be taken seriously
by Chri tians whose roots went deep
into tradition and the Scriptures.
nd so it came to pass that anyone
who questioned the tradition-particularly if his questions went to
the received understanding of the
Scriptures-was labeled a liberal.
Those thus labeled usually defined
them elves as moderates. In time,
in Missouri Synod usage, moderate
came to be a synonym for liberal.
In the late Sixties, the liberalmoderate leadership of the Synod
was replaced by a conservative
administration - a foretaste of the
revolution that would take place
in the secular order a decade later.
The new leaders made weeping
changes. Reduced to the status of
an impotent minority, liberals in
growing numbers chose to leave the
Synod and seek more congenial
fellow hip in other
tabli h d
Lutheran bodies or in the newlyorganized AELC.
For liberal theologians and church
leaders this may well have been an
unavoidable move. Some of u lay Christians in parishe where
the new Synodical order had f w if
any implications for our di cipleship-cho e a different cour e: to
stay and serve where we wer . We
were encouraged to do o b cau
two great and hopeful liberal contributions came through th upheaval of the late Sixtie th one at
least unscathed and th oth r, if
anything, enhanced.
The first of the e wa an enri h d
liturgical tradition, tra eabl
in
large part to th mu h-malign d
ociety of t. Jam , whi h had
pioneered liturgical ren wal in th
1930s. By 1970 it had
larg 1
ucce d d that only on th
frontier of th
ynod did n
h ar mutterin
ab ut R manizin
t ndenci . M anwhil , thr u h
evang lization and th u and
f

interdenominational
marriages ,
the Synod had become a melting pot
of theological traditions, ethical
and moral insights, and ways of
worship which made its traditional
insistence upon unity of doctrine
and practice as a precondition of
fellowship absurdly untenable. So
while some of our leader till like,
for old times sake, to grumble about
"ecumaniacs," the trend in the
Synod is irreversibly ecumenicalour recent habby treatment of the
American Lutheran Church being
the exception that proves the rule.
And the econd liberal contribution which urvived that upheaval
was a concern for the social mi ion
of the .Church, traceable to a number
of sources of which one was the great
relief effort which Luth rans
mounted to help their G rman coreligioni t after World War II and
another the civil right cru ade of
the early Fiftie . Oddly nough
som of th n w on rvativ l ad r
rth-
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For Good Reading
In a Glad New Year
In Time For Christmas
·1 lw herald anµ,<.·l•,' -,011µ, i an <.'\'erla..,tinj!, antiphon~ . . . It m , . ._ cl wn
the enturies ab \'(', beneath, and in
th •arth lrom .hri. tma. t ,hri tma. to Christmas ... In it alon' i.
h pe before death and aft •r cl •ath ...
Th<.'ir song live. to the 2,
th .hri tma. , to the :3 ()()()th, and at length to
the last , hristmas tlH' world will
. ee ... And on that final hri:tma ,
as on the first, the angels will know ,
as W(' must kn w n w, that the heart
which began to beat in Bethlehem
still beats in th<.' world and for the
world ... And for us ...

0. P. Kretzmann
The Pilgrim

~Jany years will pass before you understand Christma ... In fact, you
will never understand it completely
... But you can always believe in it,
always . . . The Child has come to
keep us company ... To tell us that
heaven is nearer than we had dared
to think . . . To put the hope of
eternity in our eyes ... To tell us
that the manger is ne\'er empty for
those who return to it ... And you
will find with Him, I know, a happiness which you will never find
alone ...

0 . P. Kretzman n

A Free Gift Book for New Subscribers
Mail to:

0. P. Kretzmann, President of Valparai o niversity from 1940 to 1968,
was also Editor of The Cresset from
1937 to 1968. In these two rare books
many of his beloved "The Pilgrim"
meditation wer reprinted and are
now available to new Cresset ubcribers as a gift to themselves-or
to give a a thoughtful Chri tmas gift
to friends. This offer expires December
15 1982. Current subscribers who
wi h to purchase either book may do
o by ending 4.25 to cover hipping and the co t of the book.
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